[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":292},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$fweYGMQqw0vQL2z_ZU0v2jW0qf6EFeo_geLLXVFZNCqM":3,"letter-2025":287},[4,10,14,18,23,27,31,35,39,43,47,51,55,59,64,68,72,76,80,84,88,92,96,101,105,109,113,117,121,125,129,133,137,142,146,150,154,158,162,166,170,174,178,183,186,190,193,196,199,203,207,211,215,220,224,228,232,236,240,244,248,252,256,261,265,269,273,278,283],{"slug":5,"year":5,"decade":6,"title":7,"description":8,"lang":9},"1957","1950s","1957年巴菲特致股东的信","1957年证券市场的综合分析 在去年写给合伙人的信中，我写道：我认为股市整体价格高于内在价值，主要是蓝筹股估值过高。如果确实如此，所有股票都存在大幅下跌的风险，无论是否低估。无论如何，我认为，五年之后回过头来看，人们不太可能觉得现在的价格很便宜。就算大规模熊市出现，我们的套利类(workouts)部","zh",{"slug":11,"year":11,"decade":6,"title":12,"description":13,"lang":9},"1958","1958年巴菲特致股东的信","1958年股市的整体情况 我有位朋友，他管理一只中等规模的投资信托，最近他写了这样一句话：“美国人典型的性格特征是善变，这种性格造就了1958年的股票市场，如果要用一个词来形容1958年他们在股市上的情绪，这个词就是“亢奋”。",{"slug":15,"year":15,"decade":6,"title":16,"description":17,"lang":9},"1959","1959年巴菲特致股东的信","1959年股市的整体情况： 道指是人们衡量股市表现最常用的指数，但是1959年道指有些失真。去年，道指从583上涨到679，涨幅16.4%，加上股息，持有道指的投资者收益率是19.9%。",{"slug":19,"year":19,"decade":20,"title":21,"description":22,"lang":9},"1960","1960s","1960年巴菲特致股东的信","1960年股市的整体情况 1959年，道指从583点到679点，上涨16.4%，我说指数有些失真。当年，几乎所有投资公司都赚钱了，但是其中只有不到10%赶上或超过了道指涨幅。另外，道琼斯公用事业指数略微下跌，道琼斯铁路指数大幅下跌。",{"slug":24,"year":24,"decade":20,"title":25,"description":26,"lang":9},"1961","1961年巴菲特致股东的信","编者按：巴菲特在1962年写了两封致股东的信。 1961年7月22日信",{"slug":28,"year":28,"decade":20,"title":29,"description":30,"lang":9},"1962","1962年巴菲特致股东的信","主要关于合伙人的协议 今年把很多投资都放在了(非上市)公司控制上，因而如果把Dempster的股份估计为50美元一股的话，我们的总资产到十月底约增加了5.5%。今年道琼斯的表现不好（因此我们跑赢道琼斯指数22.3个百分点），如果表现好的话，我们的相对业绩就将会变得很难看。我们今年的业绩有40%可以归",{"slug":32,"year":32,"decade":20,"title":33,"description":34,"lang":9},"1963","1963年巴菲特致股东的信","上半年的表现 在1963年的上半年，道琼斯指数从652.10上升到706.88点。如果有人在这段时间内持有道琼斯成分股，考虑到红利的获得，上半年的收益将超过10%.",{"slug":36,"year":36,"decade":20,"title":37,"description":38,"lang":9},"1964","1964年巴菲特致股东的信","上半年的表现 由于我全家将于6月23日前往加利福利亚州度假，因此我在这里总结的市场水平是截止到今年6月18日的市场表现，而不是6月底。",{"slug":40,"year":40,"decade":20,"title":41,"description":42,"lang":9},"1965","1965年巴菲特致股东的信","致合伙人： 我们对贫穷的战争在1965年取得了胜利，具体说来，我们的财产比去年年底多了$12,304,060。我们在今年取得了47.2%的收益，而同期的道琼斯指数只增长了14.2%。",{"slug":44,"year":44,"decade":20,"title":45,"description":46,"lang":9},"1966","1966年巴菲特致股东的信","1966年上半年 致合伙人：",{"slug":48,"year":48,"decade":20,"title":49,"description":50,"lang":9},"1967","1967年巴菲特致股东的信","1967年巴菲特致股东的信 上半年的表现",{"slug":52,"year":52,"decade":20,"title":53,"description":54,"lang":9},"1968","1968年巴菲特致股东的信","1968年巴菲特致股东的信 上半年业绩",{"slug":56,"year":56,"decade":20,"title":57,"description":58,"lang":9},"1969","1969年巴菲特致股东的信","致各位合伙人： 大约18个月前，我写信告诉大家，因为环境的改变，因为我个人情况的改变，我有必要调整一下我们未来的业绩目标。",{"slug":60,"year":60,"decade":61,"title":62,"description":63,"lang":9},"1971","1970s","1971年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔.哈撒韦公司全体股东： 今天很高兴报告我们 1971 年的营业利润，扣除资本利得，我们的股东权益比年初增加了 14%。这个结果大大高于美国工业平均值，而且是在我们纺织业务对利润贡献不大的情况下，这些都归功于我们五年前开始的业务重组。我们管理层的主要目标仍然是提高资产报酬率和净资产收益率。但",{"slug":65,"year":65,"decade":61,"title":66,"description":67,"lang":9},"1972","1972年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1972年伯克希尔·哈撒韦的营业利润令人兴奋的达到了年初股东权益的19.8%。这些业绩都记录在我们所有的主要业务当中。但最大的利润贡献是我们的保险承保利润。保费利润已经超过了我们的历史平均水平，甚至要比我们未来的利润还要高。",{"slug":69,"year":69,"decade":61,"title":70,"description":71,"lang":9},"1973","1973年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1973年我们的财务状况是比较令人满意的。营业利润11,930,592美元，初始股东权益回报率达17.4%。虽然每股的营业利润从11.43美元上升至12.18美元，但和1972年的19.8%的股东权益回报率相比，权益利润有所下跌。这是因为股东投资的增加并不相当于利润的增",{"slug":73,"year":73,"decade":61,"title":74,"description":75,"lang":9},"1974","1974年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1974年公司整体运营业绩并不令人满意，原因在于我们的保险业务表现不好。在去年年报中已预测盈利的下降，但是下降的程度却是意料之外的。1974 年运营收入为 $8,383,576，每股$8.56，初始股东权益回报率为10.3%。这是自1970年以来最差的已实现净资产收益率",{"slug":77,"year":77,"decade":61,"title":78,"description":79,"lang":9},"1975","1975年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 去年讨论公司1975年的前景时，我们预测今年的前景不是那么令人满意。不幸的是，这个预言成真了。1975年我们的营业利润为6,713,592美元，也就是每股收益6.85美元，初始股东权益回报率为7.6%。这是自1967年以来最低的回报率。然而，正如这封信后面分析的那样，营",{"slug":81,"year":81,"decade":61,"title":82,"description":83,"lang":9},"1976","1976年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 两年惨淡业绩后，1976年经营业绩明显改善。去年我们预计保险承保业的进程将决定我们收益的大小。最终，收益超过了我们的最高预期。这在很大程度上取决于国家赔偿公司Phil Liesche管理团队的杰出成绩。",{"slug":85,"year":85,"decade":61,"title":86,"description":87,"lang":9},"1977","1977年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 1977年本公司的营业净利为2,190万美元，每股约当22.54美元，表现较年前的预期稍微好一点，在这些盈余中，每股有1.43美元的盈余，系蓝筹印花大量实现的资本利得，本公司依照投资比例认列投资收益所贡献，至于伯克希尔本身及其保险子公司已实现的资本利得或损失，则不",{"slug":89,"year":89,"decade":61,"title":90,"description":91,"lang":9},"1978","1978年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 首先，是会计相关的议题，在年底与多元零售公司的合并后，对于公司的财务报表有两项影响，首先在合并案完成后，我们对蓝筹邮票的持股比例将提高至58%左右，意味着该公司的资产负债以及盈余数字必须全部纳到伯克希尔的报表之内，在此之前，我们仅透过权益法按投资比例认列蓝筹邮票的",{"slug":93,"year":93,"decade":61,"title":94,"description":95,"lang":9},"1979","1979年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 首先，还是会计相关的议题，从去年年报开始，会计原则要求保险公司持有的股票投资在资产负债表日的评价方式，从原先的成本与市价孰低法，改按公平市价法列示，由于我们帐上的股票投资拥有大量的未实现利益，因此即便我们已提列了资本利得实现时应该支付的估计所得税负债，我们1978",{"slug":97,"year":97,"decade":98,"title":99,"description":100,"lang":9},"1980","1980s","1980年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 1980年本公司的营业利益为4,190万美元，较1979年的3,600万美元成长，但期初股东权益报酬率(持有股票投资以原始成本计)却从去年的18.6%滑落至17.8%。我们认为这个比率最能够作为衡量公司管理当局单一年度经营绩效的指针。当然要运用这项指针，还必须对包",{"slug":102,"year":102,"decade":98,"title":103,"description":104,"lang":9},"1981","1981年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 1981年的营业利益约为四千万美元，较1980年的四千二百万减少，期初股东权益报酬率(持有股权投资以原始成本计)亦从去年的17.8%滑落至15.2%。我们的新计划是让所有股东皆能指定各自所要捐赠的机关单位，(详如后述)，今年度盈余减少90万美元，往后将视我们公司所",{"slug":106,"year":106,"decade":98,"title":107,"description":108,"lang":9},"1982","1982年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 今年的营业利益约为三千一百万美元，期初股东权益报酬率(持有股权投资以原始成本计)仅约9.8%，较去年1979年的15.2%下滑，亦远低于1978年近年度的新高19.4%，主要的原因包括:",{"slug":110,"year":110,"decade":98,"title":111,"description":112,"lang":9},"1983","1983年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 去年登记为伯克希尔的股东人数由1,900人增加到2,900人，主要是由于我们与Blue Chip的合并案，但也有一部份是因为自然增加的速度，就像几年前我们一举成长突破1,000大关一样。有了这么多新股东，有必要将有关经营者与所有者间关系方面的主要企业原则加以汇整说",{"slug":114,"year":114,"decade":98,"title":115,"description":116,"lang":9},"1984","1984年巴菲特致股东的信","致Berkshire公司全体股东 1984年伯克希尔的净值约增加了一亿五千万美金，每股约等于133美金，这个数字看起来似乎还不错，不过若考虑所投入的资金，事实上只能算普通，二十年来我们的净值约以22.1%年复合成长率增加(从1965年的19.46到1984年的1,108.77)，去年则只有13.6%",{"slug":118,"year":118,"decade":98,"title":119,"description":120,"lang":9},"1985","1985年巴菲特致股东的信","致Berkshire公司全体股东： 各位可能还记得去年年报最后提到的那个爆炸性消息，平时表面上虽然没有什么征兆，但我们的经验显示偶尔也会有一些大动做出现，这种精心设计的企业策略终于在1985年有了结果，在今年报告的后半部将会讨论到(a)我们在资本城\u002FABC的重大投资头寸(b)我们对史考特费泽的并购(",{"slug":122,"year":122,"decade":98,"title":123,"description":124,"lang":9},"1986","1986年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 我们在1986年的资产净值增加了4.925亿美元，为26.1%。在过去的22年里(也就是目前管理层接管以来)，我们的每股账面价值从19.46美元增长到2073.06美元，年复合增长率为23.3%。分子和分母在每股账面价值的计算中都很重要：在这22年的时间里，我们的公司净",{"slug":126,"year":126,"decade":98,"title":127,"description":128,"lang":9},"1987","1987年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 本公司在1987年的净值增加了四亿六千四百万，较去年增加了19.5%，而过去23年以来(自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股净值从19元成长到现在的2,477美元，年复合成长率约为23.1%。",{"slug":130,"year":130,"decade":98,"title":131,"description":132,"lang":9},"1988","1988年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 本公司1988年的净值增加了五亿六千九百万美元，较去年增加了20.0%，而过去24年以来(自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股净值从19元成长到现在的2,974美元，年复合成长率约为23.0%。",{"slug":134,"year":134,"decade":98,"title":135,"description":136,"lang":9},"1989","1989年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 本公司1989年的净值增加了15亿1千5百万美元，较去年增加了44.4%，过去25年以来(也就是自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股净值从19美元成长到现在的4,296美元，年复合成长率约为23.8%。",{"slug":138,"year":138,"decade":139,"title":140,"description":141,"lang":9},"1990","1990s","1990年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 去年我们曾经预测过，伯克希尔的净值在未来的三年内有可能会减少，结果在1990年的下半年我们差点就证明了这项预测的真实性，还好年底前股票价格的上涨使得我们公司的净值，还是较前一个年度增加7.3%，约3.62亿美元；而总计过去26年以来(也就是自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股",{"slug":143,"year":143,"decade":139,"title":144,"description":145,"lang":9},"1991","1991年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1991年本公司的净值成长了21亿美元，较去年增加了39.6%，而总计过去27年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值从19元成长到现在的6,437美元，年复合成长率约为23.7%。",{"slug":147,"year":147,"decade":139,"title":148,"description":149,"lang":9},"1992","1992年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1992年本公司的净值成长了20.3%，总计过去28年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的7,745美元，年复合成长率约为23.6%。",{"slug":151,"year":151,"decade":139,"title":152,"description":153,"lang":9},"1993","1993年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1993年本公司的净值成长了14.3%，总计过去29年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的8,854美元，年复合成长率约为23.3%。",{"slug":155,"year":155,"decade":139,"title":156,"description":157,"lang":9},"1994","1994年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1994年本公司的净值成长了14.5亿美元，为14.3%，总计过去30年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的10,083美元，年复合成长率约为23%。",{"slug":159,"year":159,"decade":139,"title":160,"description":161,"lang":9},"1995","1995年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1995年本公司的净值成长了45%约53亿美元，但由于去年以发行股份的方式并购了两家公司，使得发行在外股份增加了1.3%，所以每股净值仅成长了43.1%，而总计过去31年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的14,426美元，年复合成长",{"slug":163,"year":163,"decade":139,"title":164,"description":165,"lang":9},"1996","1996年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1996年本公司的净值成长了36.1%，约62亿美元，不过每股净值仅成长了31.8%，原因在于去年我们以发行新股的方式并购了国际飞安公司，同时另外还追加发行了一些B级普通股，总计过去32年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的19,01",{"slug":167,"year":167,"decade":139,"title":168,"description":169,"lang":9},"1997","1997年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1997年本公司的净值增加了80亿美元，每股账面净值不管是A级股或B级股皆成长了34.1%，总计过去33年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的25,488美元，年复合成长率约为24.1%。",{"slug":171,"year":171,"decade":139,"title":172,"description":173,"lang":9},"1998","1998年巴菲特致股东的信","1998年本公司的净值增加了259亿美元，每股帐面净值不管是A级股或B级股皆成长了48.3%，总计过去34年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的37,801美元，年复合成长率约为24.7%*。 *1在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，这是本公司在19",{"slug":175,"year":175,"decade":139,"title":176,"description":177,"lang":9},"1999","1999年巴菲特致股东的信","伯克希尔哈撒韦股份有限公司致所有股东： 本公司1999年的净值增加了3.58亿美元，每股A股或B股的账面净值皆成长了0.5%，累计过去35年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的37,987美元，年复合成长率约为24.0%。",{"slug":179,"year":179,"decade":180,"title":181,"description":182,"lang":9},"2000","2000s","2000年巴菲特致股东的信","附注：下表系主席致股东信的参考资料，并载于年度报告的封面。 注：",{"slug":184,"year":184,"decade":180,"title":185,"description":182,"lang":9},"2001","2001年巴菲特致股东的信",{"slug":187,"year":187,"decade":180,"title":188,"description":189,"lang":9},"2002","2002年巴菲特致股东的信","附注：下表系董事长致股东信的参考资料，并载于年度报告的封面。 注：",{"slug":191,"year":191,"decade":180,"title":192,"description":189,"lang":9},"2003","2003年巴菲特致股东的信",{"slug":194,"year":194,"decade":180,"title":195,"description":189,"lang":9},"2004","2004年巴菲特致股东的信",{"slug":197,"year":197,"decade":180,"title":198,"description":189,"lang":9},"2005","2005年巴菲特致股东的信",{"slug":200,"year":200,"decade":180,"title":201,"description":202,"lang":9},"2006","2006年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东: 伯克希尔集团在2006年的净值，增加了169亿美元。因此，A股与B股的每股净值，都较去年成长了18.4%。过去42年（亦即现任管理阶层接手以来)，每股净值由$19成长至$70,281，平均年复合成长率为21.4%。",{"slug":204,"year":204,"decade":180,"title":205,"description":206,"lang":9},"2007","2007年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东: 伯克希尔在2007年的净值收益为123亿美元。A股与B股的每股净值，都较去年成长11%。过去43年（即现任管理阶层接手以来)，每股账面价值由19美元增长为78,008美元，平均年复合成长率为21.1%。",{"slug":208,"year":208,"decade":180,"title":209,"description":210,"lang":9},"2008","2008年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东： 2008 年我们的市值缩水了 115 亿美元。这让我们两种股票的每股账面价值下滑了 9.6％。在过去的 44 年中（也就是说，现任管理层继任以来），我们的股票每股账面价值从 19美元上升到了 70530 美元，每年增长率为 20.3%。（本报告中所有每股数据是指伯克",{"slug":212,"year":212,"decade":180,"title":213,"description":214,"lang":9},"2009","2009年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东： 2009 年，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的净值增长了 218 亿美元，从而使我们 A 股和 B 股的账面价值每股均上涨 19.8%。在过去 45 年间，即现任管理层接管公司以来，账面价值从 19 美元升至 84,487 美元，每年的复合增长率达 20.3%。(本报告中所有每股数据",{"slug":216,"year":216,"decade":217,"title":218,"description":219,"lang":9},"2010","2010s","2010年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 2010 年，我们 A 股和 B 股的每股账面价值都增长了 13%。也就是说，自从现任管理层接手公司之后，在过去 46 年中，每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 95，453 美元，年复合增长率为 20.2%。",{"slug":221,"year":221,"decade":217,"title":222,"description":223,"lang":9},"2011","2011年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们： 2011 年，我们公司的 A 股和 B 股（相当于 A 股的 1500 分之 1）的每股账面净值都增长了 4.6%。过去 47 年期间（也就是说从现在的管理层接管公司开始至今），每股账面净值从19 美元增长到了 99,860 美元，每年复合增长率为 19.8%。",{"slug":225,"year":225,"decade":217,"title":226,"description":227,"lang":9},"2012","2012年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦有限公司的股东： 2012 年，伯克希尔为股东实现了 241 亿美元的回报。我们花了 13 亿美元回购股票，因此公司净值今年增长了 228 亿。A 级和 B 级股票的每股账面价值增长了 14.4%。过去的 48年（即从现任的管理层接受以来），每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到了 11",{"slug":229,"year":229,"decade":217,"title":230,"description":231,"lang":9},"2013","2013年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦有限公司的股东： 2013 年，伯克希尔的净值增长了 342 亿美元。这是抵消了 18 亿美元的账面冲销后的数据，账面冲销源于我们购买 Marmon 和 Iscar 的少数股权——这些冲销没有实质上的经济意义，我后面会解释。扣除上述摊销费用后，伯克希尔的 A 级和 B 级股票每股账",{"slug":233,"year":233,"decade":217,"title":234,"description":235,"lang":9},"2014","2014年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔.哈撒韦公司的股东： 2014年伯克希尔的净值增长了183亿美元，公司A类和B类股的每股账面价值增长8.3%。在过去的50年中(即现任管理层上任以来)，公司每股账面价值已从19美元增至146,186美元，年均复合增长率折合为19.4%。①",{"slug":237,"year":237,"decade":217,"title":238,"description":239,"lang":9},"2015","2015年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们： 伯尔希克·哈撒韦公司2015年的净资产为154亿美元，公司A类和B类股票的每股账面价值增长6.4%。在过去的51年时间里（即现有管理层接手公司开始），公司股票的每股账面价值从19美元增加至155501美元，年复合增长率为19.2%。",{"slug":241,"year":241,"decade":217,"title":242,"description":243,"lang":9},"2016","2016年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东： 2016年伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司净值大增275亿美元，公司A级和B级股票每股账面价值的涨幅都达到了10.7%。在过去的52年时间里(自现有管理层接管公司之后)，公司每股账面价值已经从19美元涨至172108美元，综合年增幅达到19%。",{"slug":245,"year":245,"decade":217,"title":246,"description":247,"lang":9},"2017","2017年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司的股东： 伯克希尔在2017年净资产增值653亿美元，A类和B类股票的每股账面价值均增长23%。在过去的53年里（也就是从现在管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长到211750美元，年复合增长率为19.1%。*",{"slug":249,"year":249,"decade":217,"title":250,"description":251,"lang":9},"2018","2018年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔.哈撒韦公司的股东： 2018年当中，伯克希尔的通用会计准则（GAAP）盈利总计为40亿美元。具体而言，这当中包括248亿美元运营盈利，30亿美元源于无形资产受损的非现金亏损（几乎全部来自卡夫亨氏的持股），28亿美元的来自已售出投资证券的兑现资本利得，以及206亿美元的“亏损”，后者是来自",{"slug":253,"year":253,"decade":217,"title":254,"description":255,"lang":9},"2019","2019年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔哈撒伟股东： 根据美国通用会计准则（GAAP），伯克希尔2019年盈利814亿美元，其中包括：运营利润为240亿美元，37亿美元的已实现资本收益，537亿美元是从我们持有股票的未实现资本收益净额的增加中获得的收益。上述收益的每一部分都是在税后基础上列出的。",{"slug":257,"year":257,"decade":258,"title":259,"description":260,"lang":9},"2020","2020s","2020年巴菲特致股东的信","伯克希尔哈撒韦公司致股东： 根据美国公认会计准则（GAAP），伯克希尔2020年的盈利为425亿美元。这一数字的四个组成部分是219亿美元的营业利润，49亿美元的实现资本利得，我们持有的股票中存在的净未实现资本利得增加所带来的267亿美元收益，最后，我们拥有的一些子公司和附属公司的价值减记导致的11",{"slug":262,"year":262,"decade":258,"title":263,"description":264,"lang":9},"2021","2021年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东：  查理·芒格，我的长期合伙人，我的工作是管理你的一部分储蓄。我们非常感谢您的信任。 我们的职位也有责任向你报告我们想知道的事情，如果我们是缺席的老板，而你是经理。我们很高 兴通过这封年信和年会直接与您进行交流。 我们的政策是平等地对待所有的股东。因此，我们不与",{"slug":266,"year":266,"decade":258,"title":267,"description":268,"lang":9},"2022","2022年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东： 　　查理·芒格，我的长期合作伙伴，我们的工作是管理很多人的储蓄。我们感谢他们持久的信任，这种关系往往贯穿他们成年后的大部分时间。在我写这封信的时候，我首先想到的就是那些热心的储蓄者。",{"slug":270,"year":270,"decade":258,"title":271,"description":272,"lang":9},"2023","2023年巴菲特致股东的信","2月24日晚间，“股神”沃伦·巴菲特旗下公司伯克希尔·哈撒韦公布了2023年四季度、全年财报，以及最新的巴菲特第47封年度致股东信（附历年股东信合辑）。 同时，在2023年财报中，巴菲特特别发布了一篇纪念老搭档查理·芒格的文章，题为《查理·芒格——伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的缔造者 》（《Charlie",{"slug":274,"year":274,"decade":258,"title":275,"description":276,"lang":277},"2024","2024年度信（官方英文原文）","BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.  To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:","en",{"slug":279,"year":279,"decade":280,"title":281,"description":282,"lang":9},"2025-meeting","附录","2025巴菲特股东大会全程实录（非年度信，附于文末）","十大讲话要点： 1、谈接班人：计划在年底退休，阿贝尔在各方面都做好了担任伯克希尔哈CEO的准备，将建议董事会在年底前任命阿贝尔为公司CEO。",{"slug":284,"year":284,"decade":258,"title":285,"description":286,"lang":277},"2025","2025年度信（官方英文原文）","Berkshire Hathaway Inc.  To My Fellow Berkshire Shareholders,",{"slug":284,"year":284,"decade":258,"title":285,"description":286,"lang":277,"html":288,"toc":289,"prev":290,"next":291},"\u003Cp>Berkshire Hathaway Inc.\nTo My Fellow Berkshire Shareholders,\nWarren Buffett is arguably the greatest investor of all time, with generations benefiting from his\ninvestment acumen. He has also been a remarkable CEO, executing his vision of building a great\ninsurance business since the acquisition of National Indemnity in 1967, and deploying the float to\nmake successful investments across major sectors of the economy, concentrating in the U.S. (To\nWarren’s great frustration, this letter begins with these observations – yet we all know they are\ntrue.)\nIn the past, Warren has spoken about how he draws inspiration from Ted Williams – the baseball\nHall of Fame hitter who divided the strike zone into 77 segments and tried to swing only at pitches\nin a much smaller “happy zone,” resulting in a .344 career batting average and a historic .406\nseason in 1941. Similar discipline, patience, and judgment define Warren’s investing: determining\npreferred pitches, waiting for them, then swinging decisively. But he is more than an investing\nguru. Warren built Berkshire into an enduring enterprise with his business partner Charlie Munger.\nThey combined world-class capital allocation with the vision and leadership to create a business\nfully equipped to transition from founder-led to one well-positioned for the next 60 years and\nbeyond.\nMore than these achievements, what endures is how Berkshire treated its shareholders as true\npartners for 60 years. Warren has frequently expressed his respect and appreciation for Berkshire’s\nlong-term shareholders, who represent one of the most remarkable owner bases of any publicly\nowned business. He invested alongside us, wrote with candor about both mistakes and successes,\nand welcomed us to Omaha each year for open, unfiltered discussion. His annual shareholder\nletters and direct interactions at Berkshire’s annual shareholder meetings are the clearest\nexpression of Warren’s – and Berkshire’s – commitment to partnership with our shareholders.\nWe are fortunate to have Warren as Berkshire’s Chairman, in the office five days a week, and\navailable to us as we underwrite insurance, operate our non-insurance businesses, and deploy\ncapital including equity investments. Warren also continues as an owner of Berkshire (although his\nshares will all go to philanthropy over the 10 years or so following his passing).\nTo invest in Berkshire has long been a vote of trust in our founder – a trust that now rests with\nBerkshire. Your capital is commingled with ours, but it does not belong to us. Our role is\nstewardship. That stewardship has shaped a culture and reinforced a set of values that are not the\nresult of our success, but the reason for it.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>I am honored by our Board’s decision to appoint me CEO of Berkshire and humbled to succeed\nWarren as I write my first annual letter to you. Warren is obviously a very hard act to follow.\n1\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Stepping into any leadership role begins with understanding the organization – why it exists, how\nits culture shapes its people, and what values guide its decisions. While you will see similarities\nand differences between Warren, Charlie, and me, we share the view that Berkshire is shareholder-\noriented to an unusual degree.\nMy understanding of Berkshire in this way began in 1992, when I moved to Omaha to join\nCalEnergy, then unaffiliated with Berkshire. CalEnergy was partly owned by Peter Kiewit Sons’,\nand chaired by Walter Scott, Jr., who was also a Berkshire director. Walter had succeeded Peter\nKiewit as the firm’s CEO and set a standard for leadership that mattered greatly to me.\nMy specific roles at CalEnergy matter little today. What matters is that it was an extraordinary\nperiod of personal development. I felt fortunate to live in Omaha, a city that represented a form of\ncapitalism grounded in fundamentals and advanced by values, anchored in businesses built to last,\nacross industries such as insurance, construction, railroads, manufacturing, and – soon – energy.\nI met Warren and Charlie after CalEnergy became MidAmerican Energy Holdings and was\nacquired by Berkshire. I admired how they worked together to build an enterprise that reflected\ntheir beliefs about business and life. Those beliefs fostered Berkshire’s culture and values that\ncontinue to guide the company today, enabling it to endure through market cycles, disruptions, and\nchange. Our durability comes from knowing who we are and how we operate.\nThat deep understanding of the role our culture and values play in our success is shared by our\nunique shareholders – our partners in this enterprise. Through my engagement with you at annual\nmeetings, I recognize how you want us to succeed together, and to do so in the right way.\nBerkshire’s culture and values form the basis of our operating framework, which shapes the\nstrategy we pursue and the choices we make as we build Berkshire. As CEO, the framework\ngoverns how I lead every day.\nOur owners’ time horizon extends beyond the tenure of any individual CEO. I will not be your\nCEO for the next 60 years as simple arithmetic makes that – shall we say – an ambitious plan.\nHowever, 20 years from now, when I will have just a fraction of the tenure that Warren had, my\nintention is that you – or your descendants – will be proud that your company is even stronger.\nCulture and Foundational Values\nBerkshire’s success depends on our nearly 400,000 employees. Their commitment to applying our\nculture and values across Berkshire’s operating businesses – from See’s Candies to GEICO and\neverything in between – and in every circumstance is central to our progress. Our success also\nbenefits from our Board’s leadership and ongoing alignment with our focus.\n2\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Last month, I sent a letter to our employees to emphasize that Berkshire’s culture and values remain\nunchanged and will continue into perpetuity. It is important to share with you the full articulation\nof this statement that was provided to them, with additional observations (shown in regular type)\nabout what they mean to me personally, based on my experience at Berkshire. While these values\nare listed individually, they are mutually reinforcing and inseparable.\nBerkshire\nBerkshire is a unique conglomerate, intentionally designed to allocate capital rationally and\nefficiently. Insurance is our core, and we also hold substantial investments in businesses across\nmany other sectors. Our approach underpins our goal to be exceptional stewards of our\nshareholders’ capital, maximizing the growth in Berkshire’s intrinsic value per share over the long\nterm.\nWe are committed to strengthening the great legacy built by Warren Buffett and his business\npartner Charlie Munger, ensuring it endures through our commitment to excellence.\nOur Culture\nOur culture begins with a partnership attitude. Our shareholders are our partners whose trust we\nhave earned and must work to keep. Their interests are at the center of our decision-making.\nThis attitude goes well beyond Berkshire’s corporate office in Omaha. It extends across our\noperating businesses, where employees embrace an ownership mindset, managing our\nshareholders’ assets as if they were their own. We think in decades, act with discipline, and uphold\nour commitments. Stewardship is embedded in how we operate, reinforcing that our culture is a\nsystem for generating long-term performance, not just a set of beliefs.\nCharlie’s comment on May 1, 2021, that “Greg will keep the culture” will forever resonate with\nme. It was a reminder that our culture is our most treasured asset, a call to maintain what defines\nBerkshire, and a challenge to ensure our culture continues.\nWhen I led Berkshire Hathaway Energy (BHE), Berkshire’s culture influenced how we operated.\nWhen capital was allocated or underlying risks were assessed, Warren’s questions consistently cut\nto the heart of the issue. Beyond that, we were entrusted with real autonomy to run the business,\nalways focusing on our customers, and taking a long-term view. That owner’s mindset is expected\nfrom every Berkshire leader.\nOur Foundational Values\nThe foundational values that follow are statements of principle that we embrace fully and strive\nevery day to achieve.\n3\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Decentralized Model\nWe seek the best managers to run our operating businesses, who in turn lead talented teams. We\noperate a decentralized model with autonomy grounded in deserved trust. We minimize\nbureaucracy to provide our managers the independence to focus relentlessly on their business. In\nreturn, we expect accountability and integrity in performance. This autonomy attracts exceptional\npeople to Berkshire.\nAs I transitioned to Vice Chairman – Non-Insurance Operations in 2018, the leaders of those\noperating businesses shared a similar question: will the decentralized model and their\nresponsibilities change? I assured them I had lived the culture of autonomy paired with\naccountability and seen the results. Decisions are made faster, with better knowledge and greater\nconviction, when they are made by those who are closest to the business and have accountability\nfor its outcomes. This will not change. Our CEOs will never have to navigate layers of bureaucracy\nor have short-term earnings expectations dictated to them, leading to long-term value destruction.\nOur decentralized approach is a competitive advantage, attracting managers who thrive on\nautonomy and deliver on accountability. Berkshire must have leaders that reflect its principles, and\nnot principles that fit individuals.\nIntegrity\nWe uphold Berkshire’s reputation for integrity, as demonstrated by alignment between how we\nthink, what we say, and what we do. We make decisions that uphold our culture, communicate with\ncandor and transparency, and deliver on our commitments. The result is a reputation that is\nearned, not claimed, through cumulative principled conduct. Every action reflects a deliberate\neffort to deepen the trust placed in Berkshire.\nFor over 25 years, at each shareholder meeting we played a clip from Warren’s 1991 Salomon\nBrothers Congressional testimony: “Lose money for the firm, and I will be understanding; lose a\nshred of reputation for the firm, and I will be ruthless.” Our commitment to integrity has always\nbeen steadfast and uncompromising. We know integrity is not a quality you admire on a shelf; it\nis an active quality that must be earned, re-earned, and maintained daily.\nWe will encounter business successes and setbacks. When we fail, we will say so. Doing the right\nthing also means rectifying our errors. A great example of both is BNSF’s resolution in 2025 of a\nlongstanding dispute with the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community over crude oil shipments\nacross Tribal lands. The BNSF decisions that sparked the dispute were made long ago, but the\ncurrent BNSF leadership built a partnership rooted in communication, understanding, and respect.\nBNSF acknowledged its past mistakes and apologized, paving the way for mutually beneficial\nagreements that allow it to meet customer needs while operating safely on Tribal lands.\n4\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Across our operating businesses, we make choices every day about how we conduct ourselves. We\nhave hundreds of thousands of employees who are good people and act with integrity and do the\nright thing. But in any large organization a small minority will fail to meet our standards. We will\nnot tolerate such behavior. When it occurs, we will act decisively and ruthlessly to address it.\nProtecting our integrity and reputation is a never-ending journey. You can rest assured that we will\nremain relentless in this effort.\nFinancial Strength\nWe maintain a fortress-like balance sheet, ensuring Berkshire’s foundation is never compromised.\nWe preserve this financial strength by using debt sparingly and prudently. Our substantial liquidity\nenables us to meet our obligations even under the most adverse conditions and to respond swiftly\nwhen opportunities arise.\nWe are committed to maintaining exceptional financial strength. Our balance sheet is a strategic\nasset to be deployed at the right time. It allows us to act decisively, invest when others are tentative\nor fearful, and stand firm when financial storms roll through.\nWe uphold Berkshire’s financial resilience and independence by holding limited levels of debt. We\nwill remain an asset, not a risk, to America and the global financial system. Our cash and U.S.\nTreasury holdings now exceed $370 billion. While some of this capital is required to support our\ninsurance operations and protect Berkshire against extreme scenarios, it also constitutes our dry\npowder.\nThere will undoubtedly be incremental opportunities to deploy our owners’ capital without\ncompromising Berkshire’s resilience. My role is to ensure our liquidity levels and capital\ndeployment remain intentional and deliberate. We will always aim for ownership of productive\nbusinesses over U.S. Treasuries.\nCapital Discipline\nWe deploy our shareholders’ capital to opportunities that generate rewards commensurate with\ntheir risk. When we expand existing operations, acquire new operating businesses, invest in equity\nsecurities, and repurchase Berkshire stock, we evaluate each opportunity based on its potential to\ngrow Berkshire’s intrinsic value per share over a time horizon measured in perpetuity.\nBerkshire’s capital allocation principles and strategy guide us in identifying opportunities:\n•\nInvest in businesses that we thoroughly understand, with durable advantages and long-term\neconomic prospects;\n•\nPartner with high integrity leaders who understand their customers and act like owners;\n5\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>•\nAvoid businesses that undermine the fabric of society or could jeopardize Berkshire’s\nreputation;\n•\nAct quickly and concentrate our capital in a few high conviction ideas; and\n•\nMaintain discipline and let compounding unfold.\nThese criteria enable us to effectively and efficiently evaluate opportunities that come our way.\nDespite our substantial size, we take pride in a nimble culture where big investment opportunities\ncan be confidentially shared with us, with a prompt response assured (and if we like it, no financing\ncontingency attached). We quickly say “no” to those that do not align with our principles, and\npursue those that do, knowing there will be many more of the former than the latter.\nMany times in Berkshire’s history, some observers have suggested that our substantial cash\nposition signals a retreat from investing. It does not. We continue to evaluate many opportunities\nand will remain patient and disciplined in pursuing the right ones for the benefit of our owners.\nIn 2025, our approach resulted in Berkshire announcing the acquisition of two very different\nbusinesses: OxyChem and Bell Laboratories.\nOxyChem is a well-run industrial chemicals business we first encountered through our investment\nin Occidental. The chlorine and caustic soda it produces serve essential markets, led by\nconstruction and core industrial uses. Management prioritizes efficient execution over volume,\nsupported by an integrated asset base and access to low-cost raw materials. For Berkshire, this\ntranslates into cash flows from a compelling addition to our operating businesses.\nLast year, Warren received a letter from Steve Levy, Bell Laboratories’ CEO, asking that we look\nat the family-owned business he manages for the daughters of founder Malcolm Stack. Steve’s\nletter was perfect. Bell Laboratories meets a persistent need: rodent control. In Steve’s words, it\npossesses “high operating margins, very good historical growth and future growth potential, easy\nto understand and always needed, and a strong management team.” In our words: a business with\ndurable advantages and long-term economic prospects run by excellent managers. We only wish it\nhad been ten times bigger.\nThese investments now join Berkshire’s strong set of operating businesses. Some of them require\nlittle incremental investment and return excess cash to Berkshire; others present compelling\ninvestment opportunities that will compound over time.\nShare repurchases are another important capital allocation option. We will buy back Berkshire\nshares when they trade below our estimate of intrinsic value, conservatively determined, ensuring\nthat repurchases enhance per-share value for continuing owners. We may also purchase large\nblocks of shares directly from major holders when the opportunity presents itself. These purchases\nallow shareholders to own an incrementally larger piece of Berkshire’s businesses, without\ndeploying any additional capital of their own.\n6\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Our approach to cash dividends continues to be that Berkshire will not pay dividends so long as\nmore than one dollar of market value for shareholders is reasonably likely to be created by each\ndollar of retained earnings. On an annual basis, the Board reviews our policy.\nOur capital discipline guides us, whether we seek to purchase an entire business, a portion of equity\nin a publicly traded company, or our own shares. We maintain this approach regardless of the size\nof our cash and U.S. Treasury holdings. We will assess value carefully, act patiently, and hold for\nthe long term – preferably forever.\nRisk Management\nWe identify risks and strive to manage the level of risk across our organization. Our approach is\ndecentralized, suited to each operating business’s scale and complexity. We focus on risks that\ncould threaten Berkshire’s reputation, financial strength, or ability to realize opportunities for the\nlong term.\nRisk management is central to Berkshire. The CEO is responsible for serving as Chief Risk Officer\n– there is no more important duty.\nAn important part of fulfilling that responsibility is having the best on our team. When it comes to\nrisk, Ajit wrote the playbook. His rigor in managing and pricing risk sets the standard in insurance.\nAny contract can be subject to legal challenge, and new coverages are particularly dangerous. We\noften set a price today for a cost that may not be known for many years. Pricing insurance risk\ncorrectly is essential, and we will walk away when the price is wrong. This approach is core to our\ninsurance business, and Ajit is simply peerless at doing it.\nAs a result, our insurance operations are a global powerhouse, able to accept risks others cannot,\nand pay claims without hesitation. Our unmatched financial strength allows us to retain\nunderwriting risk and preserve the full economics for our owners, rather than dilute it through the\npurchase of reinsurance.\nOf course, understanding and managing risk is also essential for our non-insurance businesses.\nEach must thoroughly assess its specific risks and plan for new risks before pursuing new or\nincremental opportunities.\nAcross all our businesses, our responsibility is to understand the risks and actively manage them.\n7\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Operational Excellence\nWe pursue operational excellence across our operating businesses. Our employees continuously\nstrive to exceed customer expectations, improve efficiency to better compete and prepare for\nchallenges to our operating models, and reinvest prudently in their operations. We recognize that\nperformance fluctuates year to year, so we assess a business’s success not by short-term results\nbut by its ability over the long term to maintain and strengthen its competitive position and improve\nits economic prospects.\nOperational excellence at Berkshire is not a program. It is the result of disciplined decision making\nacross our businesses. That work starts with safety and carries through to how we serve customers,\nmake products, and compete – every day.\nIn February 2025, Precision Castparts’ response to a major fire at its Jenkintown, Pennsylvania\nfacility showed Berkshire at its best. All employees on site were evacuated safely. The team then\nworked closely with first responders, providing site layouts and identifying potential hazards. In the\naftermath, Precision Castparts supported the local volunteer fire department, assisted the city, and\nconducted extensive environmental testing that confirmed the area was safe.\nAt the same time, the fire created a significant operational challenge. The facility produced more\nthan 700 parts that were sole-sourced and critical to major aerospace customers. Mark Donegan,\nPrecision Castparts’ CEO, and his team quickly redistributed production across U.S. and\ninternational sites, doing so without compromising safety, quality, or delivery standards. No\ncustomer experienced a production line stoppage. The episode reflected our model at work:\ndecentralized leadership, clear accountability, and exceptional execution under pressure.\nThe daily pursuit of excellence must be never-ending. By focusing on customers, efficiency, and\ncontinuous improvement, we create value over the long term.\nTaken together, the foundational values listed above built Berkshire, and equip us to succeed in the\ndecades ahead. While we have set them out explicitly this year, we will publish them as an\nattachment to future letters, with each letter discussing how we practiced those values across\nBerkshire.\nTheir impact is also very evident in the operating performance of our businesses today.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>Berkshire’s Performance\nBerkshire delivered operating earnings of $44.5 billion in 2025, below $47.4 billion in 2024 and\nabove the $37.5 billion we have averaged over the past five years, a result that underscored the\ndurability of our operating businesses, while also reflecting the fact that we have opportunities for\nfurther improvement.\n8\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Before diving into details, it is worth reiterating a Berkshire belief: our GAAP net earnings – with\nits sometimes-large annual swings from realized and unrealized investment gains and losses – must\nbe assessed with caution. These gains and losses matter over the long run, but when evaluating\nBerkshire’s annual business performance, we believe operating earnings remains the best measure.\nEqually important is the cash our businesses generate. In 2025, Berkshire produced $46 billion of\nnet cash flows from operating activities, compared to a five-year average of more than $40 billion,\nunderscoring our ability to invest in opportunities across our businesses.\nInsurance Operations\nIn 2025, Berkshire’s insurance operations accomplished their fundamental goals: grow\nunderwriting profits and float in a disciplined manner.\nWe own an extraordinary group of insurance businesses, each managed with a long-term\norientation. Their performance reflected both their inherent strengths and an industry that, after\nseveral years of needed adjustments to pricing and policy terms, in 2025 began to experience a\ndeceleration or reversal of these trends, particularly in the latter half of the year. This likely means\nwe will write less property and casualty business for a period of time.\nAlthough the year began with significant wildfire-related losses in Los Angeles, the Atlantic\nhurricane season was unusually benign. For the first time in a decade, no hurricane made landfall in\nthe U.S., our largest region of global exposure for our primary insurance and reinsurance\nbusinesses – a reminder that nature controls the winds, not Warren and certainly not me.\nWe produced a combined ratio of 87.1% across our property and casualty businesses in 2025,\ncomparing favorably with our five-year average of 90.7%, ten-year average of 93.0% and twenty-\nyear average of 92.2%, an exceptional underwriting result for an insurer of our scale. (Our\nretroactive reinsurance business, which does not receive regular premiums, is excluded from these\nfigures.)\nNo discussion of our insurance businesses would be complete without again acknowledging and\nappreciating Ajit. For nearly four decades, his judgment and discipline have shaped our ability to\nunderwrite large and complex risks with care and precision. The organization and team he built\nunderstand both the limits and the opportunities inherent in very large risks, and his example\ncontinues to guide our teams. Their steadiness benefits us all.\n9\nGEICO\nGEICO has been a significant contributor to the group’s lower combined ratio. Over the past few\nyears, GEICO has improved its cost structure, strengthened its underwriting discipline, and\nenhanced its ability to segment customers and the related pricing of risk. Industrywide rate\nincreases from the end of 2022 through 2024 continued to positively impact performance in 2025.\nWhile these increases varied by product and jurisdiction, the pricing environment remained firm,\nand GEICO benefited accordingly.\nGEICO’s broad rate increases in recent years have restored margins but come at the cost of lower\nretention. Competitors’ rate reductions may extend that pressure into 2026. The GEICO team\nremains focused on pricing risks correctly for both existing and new customers. Restoring retention\nwhile maintaining underwriting discipline will take time.\nAlongside retaining its customer base with a more nuanced pricing strategy, GEICO is investing\nin technology to improve efficiency and service, while preserving its position as the industry’s\nlow-cost provider.\nPrimary Group\nAcross our other primary property and casualty businesses, demand entering 2025 was solid, and\npricing in most commercial insurance business segments was adequate or improving. As the year\nprogressed, additional capital entered the market, resulting in lower pricing or decelerating rate\nincreases in several important lines. We have always prioritized underwriting discipline over\nvolume, and as pricing became less attractive, our premium growth plateaued. We expect these\nprimary insurance businesses to face continued headwinds in 2026, and potentially beyond.\nReinsurance Group\nOur reinsurance operations face similar dynamics. The reinsurance sector has attracted significant\nincreases in available capital from both the traditional and alternative markets, which together with\na more benign reinsured catastrophe loss burden in 2025 in most major regions has led to\nsignificant price declines in property reinsurance. In most casualty reinsurance segments, claims\ninflation continued to outpace pricing. As long as these phases of the cycle endure, we expect to\nwrite less reinsurance premium.\nOur insurance team will remain patient because of Berkshire’s structural strengths:\n1.\nWe have significant capital, enabling us to underwrite large and unusual risks.\n2.\nWe give our insurance managers autonomy to run their businesses, without quarterly\nearnings targets or growth mandates that might otherwise distort their underwriting\njudgment.\n10\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Col start=\"3\">\n\u003Cli>\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Fol>\n\u003Cp>We insist on underwriting discipline as the most important ingredient in insurance success.\n4.\nWe focus on the long term, resisting temporary industry enthusiasms and exuberances.\nThe environment ahead will reward insurers whose focus remains on growing underwriting profit\nsustainably, not volume; customer trust and loyalty, not temporary spikes in market share; and\nlong-term resilience, not short-lived opportunism.\nAt year-end, our insurance float – the capital we hold to pay future losses and, in the meantime,\ninvest for Berkshire’s benefit – stood at $176 billion. That amount increased from $171 billion at\nthe end of 2024 and from $88 billion at the end of 2015.\nOur insurance businesses’ ability to declare ordinary dividends to Berkshire is restricted by\ninsurance statutes and regulations, permitting up to $31 billion during 2025 without prior\nregulatory approval. The insurance businesses ultimately returned $29 billion to Berkshire in the\nyear, underscoring the continued strength of their capital base.\nNon-Insurance Operations\nOur non-insurance group is composed of strong businesses operating within the railroad, utilities\nand energy, manufacturing, service and retailing industries. It also includes Pilot and McLane.\nBerkshire’s approach with its 51 non-insurance operating businesses is markedly different from\nmost conglomerates. There are no layers of management and no allocated goals or targets set by\nBerkshire. Each business is accountable to its CEO, who is expected to pursue operational\nexcellence relentlessly and close performance gaps. Capital allocation decisions for these\nbusinesses ultimately reside with me as Berkshire’s CEO and are based on each business’s\nopportunities and related risks. Most operate with no debt, and will remain that way.\nAcross these businesses, we have made progress in the fundamentals that drive long-term value\nbut also have a clear understanding of where we need to improve performance. Regardless of\nindustry, our expectations are the same: managers who think like owners and rigorous execution –\nmeasured by results, not intentions.\nWe are fortunate to have Adam Johnson now serving as president of our consumer products,\nservice, and retailing businesses. Adam, who has lived the Berkshire culture for nearly 30 years\n(10 as CEO of NetJets), is now responsible for a group consisting of 32 companies. Adam and his\nteam at NetJets think like owners and earned their reputation for operational excellence over the\npast decade. Their work transformed NetJets from a challenged business model into a successful\nenterprise that delivers value for Berkshire shareholders. That same approach – accountability and\na focus on avoiding complacency – will guide how he works with the CEOs across his portfolio.\n11\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>BNSF\nAs one of the six major freight railroads in North America, BNSF is a key part of the transportation\nbackbone of the U.S. economy. Berkshire acquired this iconic business in 2010 with an equity\nvalue of $34.5 billion. In 2025, BNSF produced $8.1 billion in net operating cash flows and\nreturned $4.4 billion of that cash to Berkshire through dividends. For context, its average annual\ndividend over the past five years was $4.1 billion.\nSafe operations, reliable service, and a competitive cost structure ultimately determine a railroad’s\nsuccess – and accordingly how we assess management’s performance. BNSF has focused on\nimproving each of these. Safety remains the top priority, and BNSF has been the industry leader\nfor the past decade. In 2025, shipments spent less time idling at terminals and moved through the\nnetwork faster than in nearly any year in the company’s history.\nThese gains matter, but they are not enough; more progress is needed to translate operational\nimprovements into stronger financial results. We view operating margin (the inverse of the\nindustry’s operating ratio) as the best measure of performance. In 2025, BNSF’s operating margin\nimproved to 34.5% from 32.0% in 2024. It remained only modestly above its five-year average.\nThe gap to the industry’s best remains too wide and closing it will require continued improvements\nin efficiency and service. Each one-percentage-point improvement in operating margin generates\napproximately $230 million of incremental operating cash flow for our owners. The team\nrecognizes the significance of this opportunity, and we will be disappointed if we do not deliver a\nsubstantial improvement over the next few years.\nAlongside BNSF’s own improvements, there is also potential consolidation in the rail industry\nwith the proposed Union Pacific–Norfolk Southern merger. Berkshire has been clear that it is not\ninterested in acquiring one of the other Class I railroads, since the current economics would not\nwork in our shareholders’ favor. BNSF’s focus on the proposed merger has been to ensure BNSF\ncan continue to offer customers a compelling value proposition, including full and competitive\naccess to Eastern rail markets.\nBHE\nBHE’s objective is straightforward: to deliver affordable and reliable energy service for its\ncustomers. That responsibility has grown as the industry enters a significant investment cycle,\ndriven by rising electricity demand from artificial intelligence computing and by increasing\nwildfire risk, particularly in the Western U.S. Growth is welcome, but it will not come at the\nexpense of affordability or reliability for households, small businesses, and industrial users.\n12\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>BHE is proud that it continues to offer meaningful value to customers in the markets it serves –\naveraging 24% below the national retail electric rate level, with all its markets priced at least in\nthe double-digit range beneath that benchmark. Infrastructure built for hyperscalers and data\ncenters must be paid for by those customers and reflect the risks tied to step-changes in long-term\ndemand. BHE will pursue this incremental growth and invest our shareholders’ capital only when\nthose risks and rewards are appropriately balanced.\nOn wildfire risk, BHE has taken a leadership role, working with regulators, public officials, and\nthe communities it serves. Its mitigation programs are among the most comprehensive in the\nindustry. When a BHE utility is responsible for a wildfire, it has acknowledged that responsibility,\nincluding PacifiCorp’s settlements related primarily to the 2020 Labor Day fires. At the same time,\nPacifiCorp is not an insurer of last resort and should not be treated as a deep pocket. Where\nresponsibility does not exist, it will continue to seek judicial relief. Accountability, paired with\nprincipled opposition to unwarranted liability, is essential to preserving the regulatory compact\nthat governs utilities.\nBHE is rebalancing as the team positions it to move forward. In 2025, BHE produced $8.4 billion\nin net cash flows from operating activities, consistent with its five-year average, even as it absorbed\nthese challenges. Our willingness to invest capital depends on the continued functioning of the\nregulatory compact through which utilities earn a reasonable return on invested capital. Near-term\nopportunities are significant, and BHE will pursue them selectively.\nManufacturing – Industrial Products\nThe macro environment in 2025 for our industrial products businesses was challenging, yet the\nbusinesses delivered earnings results that demonstrated underlying resilience. Operational\nexecution was strong across the group, and specifically at Precision Castparts, Marmon, IMC, and\nLubrizol, which positions all of them well to pursue incremental opportunities.\nThe Lubrizol team, led by Rebecca Liebert, was integral to the acquisition of OxyChem and its\nplanned integration as a standalone operating business within Berkshire. Rebecca has assumed\nresponsibility for OxyChem in addition to her role as CEO of Lubrizol, working in partnership\nwith OxyChem CEO Wade Alleman and his leadership team.\nOur largest industrial manufacturing business, Precision Castparts, spent much of the past decade\nnavigating a difficult period for the aerospace industry. Aircraft production slowed materially,\nvolumes declined, and a series of disruptions – most notably the pandemic, when air travel\neffectively stopped – put sustained pressure on earnings.\n13\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The Precision Castparts team has now worked through the most challenging part of that period.\nAir travel has recovered, aircraft orders have resumed, and demand for the company’s components\nhas normalized and is growing. The business has remained disciplined throughout, with\nmanagement focused on translating a healthier industry backdrop into margins that better reflect\nits long-term potential. In 2025, Precision Castparts generated $2.4 billion of net cash flows from\noperating activities, compared to an average of $0.9 billion in 2021 and 2022 and $1.7 billion in\n2015, the last full fiscal year before our acquisition.\nManufacturing – Building Products\nOur building products businesses span the U.S. housing and commercial building landscape, from\nthe homes Clayton builds to the materials and finishes our other companies supply. As in any\nmarket, end-consumer preferences can evolve, and our businesses must adapt accordingly to meet\nthose changing demands.\nShaw has navigated a challenging period as consumers moved away from soft-surface flooring\n(carpets), and some of its difficulties were self-inflicted. As it expanded hard-surface production,\nexecution slipped, affecting quality and service. Shaw is now rebuilding its manufacturing\norganization and restoring the operational discipline needed to regain customer confidence.\nClayton leads the group in size. Its business model – centered on efficient manufacturing and\nconstruction of well-built homes, supported by integrated financing – has proven resilient through\nshort-term shifts in the broader housing market. This approach enables Clayton to meet the\nongoing need for quality, affordable housing nationwide.\nWhile activity in this building-products sector varies from year to year with broader construction\ntrends, the long-term needs for housing and commercial buildings remain strong, positioning the\ngroup, which also includes Johns Manville and MiTek, well for the future. This durable demand\nunderpins these operations, which are distinguished by disciplined and knowledgeable\nmanagement, a strong focus on customers, and well-established operating models.\nManufacturing – Consumer Products; and Service and Retailing\nAs highlighted earlier in the letter, Adam is president of Berkshire’s consumer products, service,\nand retailing businesses. These businesses performed well overall in 2025, recognizing certain\nconsumer segments faced a very challenging environment.\nNetJets is the largest business in our service group. NetJets maintains a relentless focus on safety\nand exceptional service to reinforce its position as a premium offering. That foundation has enabled\nNetJets to attract many customers, and today it operates nearly 1,100 aircraft in over 150 countries\naround the world. It is a prized asset in a very tough industry.\n14\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Pilot\nPilot continues to strengthen its operations. As the largest operator of travel centers in North\nAmerica, it competes on location, service, and reliability. Management has focused on execution\nat the store level – improving customer experience for both professional drivers and everyday\ntravelers, investing in store upgrades, food offerings, and customer loyalty. Since 2023, Pilot has\nincreased capital spending to modernize facilities and expand its electric vehicle charging network.\nThese efforts are reflected in Pilot’s Pro Preference score – a third-party study of how often\nprofessional drivers choose Pilot over travel center competitors – which rose from 27% in 2022 to\n35% in 2025, placing the business second in the industry. We should be #1 and we will not be\npleased until that standard is achieved. We first invested in Pilot in 2017; however, our ability to\nmanage it was contractually delayed until 2023. That mistake will not happen again.\nThe underlying economics of the business are reflected in its cash generation. In 2025, Pilot\ndelivered $1.7 billion of net cash flow from operating activities, an improvement from 2024. As\noperations continue to strengthen and capital needs normalize, we expect more cash to be returned\nto Berkshire.\nEquity Investments\nWe apply the same fundamental value of capital discipline to Berkshire’s portfolio of equity\nsecurities as we do to our operating businesses. A large portion of our portfolio is concentrated in\na small number of American companies such as Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola, and\nMoody’s – businesses we understand well, have a high regard for their leaders, and expect will\ncompound over decades. This concentrated approach will continue, with limited activity in these\nholdings, though we may significantly adjust a holding if we see fundamental changes in its long-\nterm economic prospects.\n(Dollars in millions)\nDecember 31, 2025\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Company\nPercentage of\nCompany Owned\nCost Basis\nMarket Value\n2025 Dividends\nApple Inc.\n1.6%\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>$\n6,255\n$\n61,962\n$\n280\nAmerican Express Company\n22.1%\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1,287\n56,088\n479\nThe Coca-Cola Company\n9.3%\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1,299\n27,964\n816\nMoody’s Corporation\n13.9%\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>248\n12,603\n93\nTotal\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>$\n9,089\n$\n158,617\n$\n1,668\n15\nThe same criteria apply to our investments in Japan, which we view as comparable to our major\nU.S. holdings in importance and long-term value creation opportunity.\n(Dollars in millions)\nDecember 31, 2025\nCompany\nPercentage of\nCompany Owned\nCost Basis\nMarket Value\n2025 Dividends\nMitsubishi Corporation\n10.8%\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>$\n4,248\n$\n9,207\n$\n273\nITOCHU Corporation\n10.1%\n4,165\n8,886\n181\nMitsui & Co., Ltd.\n10.4%\n3,490\n8,785\n201\nMarubeni Corporation\n9.8%\n1,572\n4,468\n105\nSumitomo Corporation\n9.7%\n1,907\n4,022\n102\nTotal\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>$\n15,382\n$\n35,368\n$\n862\nBerkshire has borrowed in Japan an amount roughly equivalent to the yen invested (cost basis), at\nan average cost of 1.2%, with a weighted-average life of approximately 5.75 years.\nTaking these positions together, at year-end they totaled $194 billion in market value, representing\nnearly two-thirds of our $297.8 billion equity securities portfolio, providing combined dividends\nof $2.5 billion and yielding 10% on their original cost basis of $24.5 billion.\nSeparately, we have meaningful positions in a small number of other companies where our capital\nallocation has been more dynamic in recent periods, as relative values and opportunities change.\nIn certain cases, the underlying business characteristics are such that, over time, these investments\nmay become part of our core holdings.\nWe also hold equity method investments, principally Kraft Heinz and Occidental. Our investment\nin Kraft Heinz has been disappointing. Even after considering the preferred equity component in\nour original Heinz investment, our return has been well short of adequate.\nAt Berkshire, equity investments are fundamental to our capital allocation activities; responsibility\nultimately resides with me as CEO. Ted Weschler manages about 6% of our investments, including\na portion of the portfolio formerly overseen by Todd Combs. Ted’s impact extends beyond these\ninvestments, as he continues to play a broader role in assessing significant opportunities, providing\nvaluable input on our businesses, and supporting Berkshire in various other ways.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>Berkshire’s foundation is second to none. We have a remarkable operating framework (our culture\nand values) that shapes our strategy and guides how we lead – along with remarkable shareholders.\nInsurance will continue to be our core. While its performance will ebb and flow with capital\nconditions in the industry – perhaps dramatically – that heart of Berkshire will only grow stronger\nover time, reflecting the structural advantages that define it.\n16\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Our non-insurance operations generate substantial operating earnings and recurring cash flows. A\nsustained focus on operational excellence will strengthen this group of businesses, positioning it\nto deliver even greater long-term value.\nOur investment portfolio – specifically, our equity investments – will evolve and grow as\nopportunities arise. This portfolio is an integral extension of our insurance operations and capital\nbase. We will effectively and efficiently return capital to our owners through share repurchases\nwhen the value proposition is compelling.\nAt Berkshire’s scale, the math of compounding works against us – a reality long understood and\nbest acknowledged plainly. Our opportunity is improvement in per-share value over the long term,\neven when progress comes in smaller increments, with a constant focus on managing downside risk\nfor our owners.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>The value we create at Berkshire stems from the judgment and leadership exercised every day\nacross our operating businesses. We as shareholders are fortunate to have a Board that clearly\nunderstands and supports Berkshire, including our culture and values, and whose diverse skills,\nexperience, and perspectives strengthen its stewardship of the company. Warren and Charlie built\nthe framework for that alignment, and we continue to draw on Warren’s exceptional judgment as\nChairman.\nIn December, we announced that our CFO, Marc Hamburg, will be retiring from Berkshire\neffective June 1, 2027, and will transition his Chief Financial Officer responsibilities a year prior\non June 1, 2026. Chuck Chang will have an enormous pair of shoes to fill as his successor. Marc\nwill help Chuck settle into his new role before fully enjoying his well-deserved retirement. Marc\nhas been a treasured partner to me, and, as Warren has noted, “Marc has been indispensable to\nBerkshire and to me. His integrity and judgment are priceless. He has done more for this company\nthan many of our shareholders will ever know.” I strongly echo Warren’s comments.\nTo further strengthen our management capabilities at the corporate office, we recently welcomed\nMike O’Sullivan as Berkshire’s first General Counsel, where he will provide legal support while\nmaintaining our culture.\nA central part of our partnership with our owners is to continue maintaining clear, candid\ncommunication with you. Berkshire will always communicate with all shareholders at the same\ntime and through the same channels to give each of you the necessary information to assess\nBerkshire’s performance.\nWe concentrate on quality, not frequency. If a significant issue arises, you will hear from me, but\nit will not be through quarterly commentary, given our long-term horizon.\n17\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>The next time we gather as owners will be in Omaha on May 2, 2026, for the annual meeting (our\nowners’ day, or what other companies might call an “investor day”). The format you know well\nwill guide the day, centered on open communication and direct engagement, with your questions\nanswered in the same unscripted manner during sessions moderated by Becky Quick. We also look\nforward to owners getting to know, over time, more of the Berkshire team.\nThis year’s program will include a CEO’s update on Berkshire, and two Q&A sessions – one with\nAjit and me, and a second featuring Katie Farmer (BNSF), Adam Johnson (NetJets and president\nof consumer products, service, and retailing), and me, where Katie and Adam will discuss the\nchallenges and opportunities they see in their respective businesses. In that way, we will be able\nto cover Berkshire’s insurance and non-insurance operations. While each session has a natural\nfocus based on who is on stage with me, shareholders may ask me any question at any time. Further\ndetails are included in this Annual Report.\nOur Board, the CEOs and managers at Berkshire, and I look forward to welcoming you to Omaha\nand to our continued partnership. Central to Berkshire’s extraordinary success is the relationship\nwe maintain with you, our owners. I am honored by the responsibility of continuing to build our\ncompany and our partnership in the years ahead. We move forward with great intent and purpose.\nGregory E. Abel\nChief Executive Officer\nFebruary 28, 2026\n18\nBerkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Annual Percentage Change\nYear\nIn Per-Share\nMarket Value of\nBerkshire\nIn S&P 500\nwith Dividends\nIncluded\n1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n49.5%\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>10.0%\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(3.4)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(11.7)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n13.3\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>30.9\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n77.8\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>11.0\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n19.4\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(8.4)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(4.6)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>3.9\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n80.5\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>14.6\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n8.1\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>18.9\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(2.5)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(14.8)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(48.7)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(26.4)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n2.5\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>37.2\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n129.3\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>23.6\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n46.8\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(7.4)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n14.5\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>6.4\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n102.5\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>18.2\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n32.8\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>32.3\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n31.8\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(5.0)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n38.4\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>21.4\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n69.0\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>22.4\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(2.7)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>6.1\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n93.7\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>31.6\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n14.2\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>18.6\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n4.6\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>5.1\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n59.3\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>16.6\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n84.6\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>31.7\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(23.1)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(3.1)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n35.6\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>30.5\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n29.8\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>7.6\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n38.9\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>10.1\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n25.0\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1.3\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9\u002F30; 1967, 15 months ended\n12\u002F31.\n19\nBerkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Annual Percentage Change\nYear\nIn Per-Share\nMarket Value of\nBerkshire\nIn S&P 500\nwith Dividends\nIncluded\n1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n57.4%\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>37.6%\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n6.2\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>23.0\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n34.9\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>33.4\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n52.2\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>28.6\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(19.9)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>21.0\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n26.6\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(9.1)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n6.5\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(11.9)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(3.8)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(22.1)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n15.8\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>28.7\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n4.3\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>10.9\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n0.8\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>4.9\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n24.1\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>15.8\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n28.7\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>5.5\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(31.8)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(37.0)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n2.7\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>26.5\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n21.4\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>15.1\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(4.7)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2.1\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n16.8\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>16.0\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n32.7\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>32.4\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n27.0\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>13.7\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(12.5)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>1.4\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n23.4\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>12.0\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n21.9\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>21.8\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n2.8\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(4.4)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n11.0\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>31.5\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n2.4\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>18.4\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n29.6\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>28.7\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n4.0\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(18.1)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n15.8\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>26.3\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n25.5\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>25.0\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n10.9\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>17.9\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Compounded Annual Gain – 1965-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n19.7%\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>10.5%\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Overall Gain – 1964-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n6,099,294%\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>46,061%\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>20\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n",[],{"slug":279,"title":281,"year":279},null,1789889214177]