[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":292},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$fweYGMQqw0vQL2z_ZU0v2jW0qf6EFeo_geLLXVFZNCqM":3,"letter-2024":287},[4,10,14,18,23,27,31,35,39,43,47,51,55,59,64,68,72,76,80,84,88,92,96,101,105,109,113,117,121,125,129,133,137,142,146,150,154,158,162,166,170,174,178,183,186,190,193,196,199,203,207,211,215,220,224,228,232,236,240,244,248,252,256,261,265,269,273,278,283],{"slug":5,"year":5,"decade":6,"title":7,"description":8,"lang":9},"1957","1950s","1957年巴菲特致股东的信","1957年证券市场的综合分析 在去年写给合伙人的信中，我写道：我认为股市整体价格高于内在价值，主要是蓝筹股估值过高。如果确实如此，所有股票都存在大幅下跌的风险，无论是否低估。无论如何，我认为，五年之后回过头来看，人们不太可能觉得现在的价格很便宜。就算大规模熊市出现，我们的套利类(workouts)部","zh",{"slug":11,"year":11,"decade":6,"title":12,"description":13,"lang":9},"1958","1958年巴菲特致股东的信","1958年股市的整体情况 我有位朋友，他管理一只中等规模的投资信托，最近他写了这样一句话：“美国人典型的性格特征是善变，这种性格造就了1958年的股票市场，如果要用一个词来形容1958年他们在股市上的情绪，这个词就是“亢奋”。",{"slug":15,"year":15,"decade":6,"title":16,"description":17,"lang":9},"1959","1959年巴菲特致股东的信","1959年股市的整体情况： 道指是人们衡量股市表现最常用的指数，但是1959年道指有些失真。去年，道指从583上涨到679，涨幅16.4%，加上股息，持有道指的投资者收益率是19.9%。",{"slug":19,"year":19,"decade":20,"title":21,"description":22,"lang":9},"1960","1960s","1960年巴菲特致股东的信","1960年股市的整体情况 1959年，道指从583点到679点，上涨16.4%，我说指数有些失真。当年，几乎所有投资公司都赚钱了，但是其中只有不到10%赶上或超过了道指涨幅。另外，道琼斯公用事业指数略微下跌，道琼斯铁路指数大幅下跌。",{"slug":24,"year":24,"decade":20,"title":25,"description":26,"lang":9},"1961","1961年巴菲特致股东的信","编者按：巴菲特在1962年写了两封致股东的信。 1961年7月22日信",{"slug":28,"year":28,"decade":20,"title":29,"description":30,"lang":9},"1962","1962年巴菲特致股东的信","主要关于合伙人的协议 今年把很多投资都放在了(非上市)公司控制上，因而如果把Dempster的股份估计为50美元一股的话，我们的总资产到十月底约增加了5.5%。今年道琼斯的表现不好（因此我们跑赢道琼斯指数22.3个百分点），如果表现好的话，我们的相对业绩就将会变得很难看。我们今年的业绩有40%可以归",{"slug":32,"year":32,"decade":20,"title":33,"description":34,"lang":9},"1963","1963年巴菲特致股东的信","上半年的表现 在1963年的上半年，道琼斯指数从652.10上升到706.88点。如果有人在这段时间内持有道琼斯成分股，考虑到红利的获得，上半年的收益将超过10%.",{"slug":36,"year":36,"decade":20,"title":37,"description":38,"lang":9},"1964","1964年巴菲特致股东的信","上半年的表现 由于我全家将于6月23日前往加利福利亚州度假，因此我在这里总结的市场水平是截止到今年6月18日的市场表现，而不是6月底。",{"slug":40,"year":40,"decade":20,"title":41,"description":42,"lang":9},"1965","1965年巴菲特致股东的信","致合伙人： 我们对贫穷的战争在1965年取得了胜利，具体说来，我们的财产比去年年底多了$12,304,060。我们在今年取得了47.2%的收益，而同期的道琼斯指数只增长了14.2%。",{"slug":44,"year":44,"decade":20,"title":45,"description":46,"lang":9},"1966","1966年巴菲特致股东的信","1966年上半年 致合伙人：",{"slug":48,"year":48,"decade":20,"title":49,"description":50,"lang":9},"1967","1967年巴菲特致股东的信","1967年巴菲特致股东的信 上半年的表现",{"slug":52,"year":52,"decade":20,"title":53,"description":54,"lang":9},"1968","1968年巴菲特致股东的信","1968年巴菲特致股东的信 上半年业绩",{"slug":56,"year":56,"decade":20,"title":57,"description":58,"lang":9},"1969","1969年巴菲特致股东的信","致各位合伙人： 大约18个月前，我写信告诉大家，因为环境的改变，因为我个人情况的改变，我有必要调整一下我们未来的业绩目标。",{"slug":60,"year":60,"decade":61,"title":62,"description":63,"lang":9},"1971","1970s","1971年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔.哈撒韦公司全体股东： 今天很高兴报告我们 1971 年的营业利润，扣除资本利得，我们的股东权益比年初增加了 14%。这个结果大大高于美国工业平均值，而且是在我们纺织业务对利润贡献不大的情况下，这些都归功于我们五年前开始的业务重组。我们管理层的主要目标仍然是提高资产报酬率和净资产收益率。但",{"slug":65,"year":65,"decade":61,"title":66,"description":67,"lang":9},"1972","1972年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1972年伯克希尔·哈撒韦的营业利润令人兴奋的达到了年初股东权益的19.8%。这些业绩都记录在我们所有的主要业务当中。但最大的利润贡献是我们的保险承保利润。保费利润已经超过了我们的历史平均水平，甚至要比我们未来的利润还要高。",{"slug":69,"year":69,"decade":61,"title":70,"description":71,"lang":9},"1973","1973年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1973年我们的财务状况是比较令人满意的。营业利润11,930,592美元，初始股东权益回报率达17.4%。虽然每股的营业利润从11.43美元上升至12.18美元，但和1972年的19.8%的股东权益回报率相比，权益利润有所下跌。这是因为股东投资的增加并不相当于利润的增",{"slug":73,"year":73,"decade":61,"title":74,"description":75,"lang":9},"1974","1974年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1974年公司整体运营业绩并不令人满意，原因在于我们的保险业务表现不好。在去年年报中已预测盈利的下降，但是下降的程度却是意料之外的。1974 年运营收入为 $8,383,576，每股$8.56，初始股东权益回报率为10.3%。这是自1970年以来最差的已实现净资产收益率",{"slug":77,"year":77,"decade":61,"title":78,"description":79,"lang":9},"1975","1975年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 去年讨论公司1975年的前景时，我们预测今年的前景不是那么令人满意。不幸的是，这个预言成真了。1975年我们的营业利润为6,713,592美元，也就是每股收益6.85美元，初始股东权益回报率为7.6%。这是自1967年以来最低的回报率。然而，正如这封信后面分析的那样，营",{"slug":81,"year":81,"decade":61,"title":82,"description":83,"lang":9},"1976","1976年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 两年惨淡业绩后，1976年经营业绩明显改善。去年我们预计保险承保业的进程将决定我们收益的大小。最终，收益超过了我们的最高预期。这在很大程度上取决于国家赔偿公司Phil Liesche管理团队的杰出成绩。",{"slug":85,"year":85,"decade":61,"title":86,"description":87,"lang":9},"1977","1977年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 1977年本公司的营业净利为2,190万美元，每股约当22.54美元，表现较年前的预期稍微好一点，在这些盈余中，每股有1.43美元的盈余，系蓝筹印花大量实现的资本利得，本公司依照投资比例认列投资收益所贡献，至于伯克希尔本身及其保险子公司已实现的资本利得或损失，则不",{"slug":89,"year":89,"decade":61,"title":90,"description":91,"lang":9},"1978","1978年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 首先，是会计相关的议题，在年底与多元零售公司的合并后，对于公司的财务报表有两项影响，首先在合并案完成后，我们对蓝筹邮票的持股比例将提高至58%左右，意味着该公司的资产负债以及盈余数字必须全部纳到伯克希尔的报表之内，在此之前，我们仅透过权益法按投资比例认列蓝筹邮票的",{"slug":93,"year":93,"decade":61,"title":94,"description":95,"lang":9},"1979","1979年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 首先，还是会计相关的议题，从去年年报开始，会计原则要求保险公司持有的股票投资在资产负债表日的评价方式，从原先的成本与市价孰低法，改按公平市价法列示，由于我们帐上的股票投资拥有大量的未实现利益，因此即便我们已提列了资本利得实现时应该支付的估计所得税负债，我们1978",{"slug":97,"year":97,"decade":98,"title":99,"description":100,"lang":9},"1980","1980s","1980年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 1980年本公司的营业利益为4,190万美元，较1979年的3,600万美元成长，但期初股东权益报酬率(持有股票投资以原始成本计)却从去年的18.6%滑落至17.8%。我们认为这个比率最能够作为衡量公司管理当局单一年度经营绩效的指针。当然要运用这项指针，还必须对包",{"slug":102,"year":102,"decade":98,"title":103,"description":104,"lang":9},"1981","1981年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 1981年的营业利益约为四千万美元，较1980年的四千二百万减少，期初股东权益报酬率(持有股权投资以原始成本计)亦从去年的17.8%滑落至15.2%。我们的新计划是让所有股东皆能指定各自所要捐赠的机关单位，(详如后述)，今年度盈余减少90万美元，往后将视我们公司所",{"slug":106,"year":106,"decade":98,"title":107,"description":108,"lang":9},"1982","1982年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 今年的营业利益约为三千一百万美元，期初股东权益报酬率(持有股权投资以原始成本计)仅约9.8%，较去年1979年的15.2%下滑，亦远低于1978年近年度的新高19.4%，主要的原因包括:",{"slug":110,"year":110,"decade":98,"title":111,"description":112,"lang":9},"1983","1983年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 去年登记为伯克希尔的股东人数由1,900人增加到2,900人，主要是由于我们与Blue Chip的合并案，但也有一部份是因为自然增加的速度，就像几年前我们一举成长突破1,000大关一样。有了这么多新股东，有必要将有关经营者与所有者间关系方面的主要企业原则加以汇整说",{"slug":114,"year":114,"decade":98,"title":115,"description":116,"lang":9},"1984","1984年巴菲特致股东的信","致Berkshire公司全体股东 1984年伯克希尔的净值约增加了一亿五千万美金，每股约等于133美金，这个数字看起来似乎还不错，不过若考虑所投入的资金，事实上只能算普通，二十年来我们的净值约以22.1%年复合成长率增加(从1965年的19.46到1984年的1,108.77)，去年则只有13.6%",{"slug":118,"year":118,"decade":98,"title":119,"description":120,"lang":9},"1985","1985年巴菲特致股东的信","致Berkshire公司全体股东： 各位可能还记得去年年报最后提到的那个爆炸性消息，平时表面上虽然没有什么征兆，但我们的经验显示偶尔也会有一些大动做出现，这种精心设计的企业策略终于在1985年有了结果，在今年报告的后半部将会讨论到(a)我们在资本城\u002FABC的重大投资头寸(b)我们对史考特费泽的并购(",{"slug":122,"year":122,"decade":98,"title":123,"description":124,"lang":9},"1986","1986年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 我们在1986年的资产净值增加了4.925亿美元，为26.1%。在过去的22年里(也就是目前管理层接管以来)，我们的每股账面价值从19.46美元增长到2073.06美元，年复合增长率为23.3%。分子和分母在每股账面价值的计算中都很重要：在这22年的时间里，我们的公司净",{"slug":126,"year":126,"decade":98,"title":127,"description":128,"lang":9},"1987","1987年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 本公司在1987年的净值增加了四亿六千四百万，较去年增加了19.5%，而过去23年以来(自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股净值从19元成长到现在的2,477美元，年复合成长率约为23.1%。",{"slug":130,"year":130,"decade":98,"title":131,"description":132,"lang":9},"1988","1988年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 本公司1988年的净值增加了五亿六千九百万美元，较去年增加了20.0%，而过去24年以来(自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股净值从19元成长到现在的2,974美元，年复合成长率约为23.0%。",{"slug":134,"year":134,"decade":98,"title":135,"description":136,"lang":9},"1989","1989年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 本公司1989年的净值增加了15亿1千5百万美元，较去年增加了44.4%，过去25年以来(也就是自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股净值从19美元成长到现在的4,296美元，年复合成长率约为23.8%。",{"slug":138,"year":138,"decade":139,"title":140,"description":141,"lang":9},"1990","1990s","1990年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 去年我们曾经预测过，伯克希尔的净值在未来的三年内有可能会减少，结果在1990年的下半年我们差点就证明了这项预测的真实性，还好年底前股票价格的上涨使得我们公司的净值，还是较前一个年度增加7.3%，约3.62亿美元；而总计过去26年以来(也就是自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股",{"slug":143,"year":143,"decade":139,"title":144,"description":145,"lang":9},"1991","1991年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1991年本公司的净值成长了21亿美元，较去年增加了39.6%，而总计过去27年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值从19元成长到现在的6,437美元，年复合成长率约为23.7%。",{"slug":147,"year":147,"decade":139,"title":148,"description":149,"lang":9},"1992","1992年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1992年本公司的净值成长了20.3%，总计过去28年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的7,745美元，年复合成长率约为23.6%。",{"slug":151,"year":151,"decade":139,"title":152,"description":153,"lang":9},"1993","1993年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1993年本公司的净值成长了14.3%，总计过去29年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的8,854美元，年复合成长率约为23.3%。",{"slug":155,"year":155,"decade":139,"title":156,"description":157,"lang":9},"1994","1994年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1994年本公司的净值成长了14.5亿美元，为14.3%，总计过去30年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的10,083美元，年复合成长率约为23%。",{"slug":159,"year":159,"decade":139,"title":160,"description":161,"lang":9},"1995","1995年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1995年本公司的净值成长了45%约53亿美元，但由于去年以发行股份的方式并购了两家公司，使得发行在外股份增加了1.3%，所以每股净值仅成长了43.1%，而总计过去31年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的14,426美元，年复合成长",{"slug":163,"year":163,"decade":139,"title":164,"description":165,"lang":9},"1996","1996年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1996年本公司的净值成长了36.1%，约62亿美元，不过每股净值仅成长了31.8%，原因在于去年我们以发行新股的方式并购了国际飞安公司，同时另外还追加发行了一些B级普通股，总计过去32年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的19,01",{"slug":167,"year":167,"decade":139,"title":168,"description":169,"lang":9},"1997","1997年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东： 1997年本公司的净值增加了80亿美元，每股账面净值不管是A级股或B级股皆成长了34.1%，总计过去33年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的25,488美元，年复合成长率约为24.1%。",{"slug":171,"year":171,"decade":139,"title":172,"description":173,"lang":9},"1998","1998年巴菲特致股东的信","1998年本公司的净值增加了259亿美元，每股帐面净值不管是A级股或B级股皆成长了48.3%，总计过去34年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的37,801美元，年复合成长率约为24.7%*。 *1在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，这是本公司在19",{"slug":175,"year":175,"decade":139,"title":176,"description":177,"lang":9},"1999","1999年巴菲特致股东的信","伯克希尔哈撒韦股份有限公司致所有股东： 本公司1999年的净值增加了3.58亿美元，每股A股或B股的账面净值皆成长了0.5%，累计过去35年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的37,987美元，年复合成长率约为24.0%。",{"slug":179,"year":179,"decade":180,"title":181,"description":182,"lang":9},"2000","2000s","2000年巴菲特致股东的信","附注：下表系主席致股东信的参考资料，并载于年度报告的封面。 注：",{"slug":184,"year":184,"decade":180,"title":185,"description":182,"lang":9},"2001","2001年巴菲特致股东的信",{"slug":187,"year":187,"decade":180,"title":188,"description":189,"lang":9},"2002","2002年巴菲特致股东的信","附注：下表系董事长致股东信的参考资料，并载于年度报告的封面。 注：",{"slug":191,"year":191,"decade":180,"title":192,"description":189,"lang":9},"2003","2003年巴菲特致股东的信",{"slug":194,"year":194,"decade":180,"title":195,"description":189,"lang":9},"2004","2004年巴菲特致股东的信",{"slug":197,"year":197,"decade":180,"title":198,"description":189,"lang":9},"2005","2005年巴菲特致股东的信",{"slug":200,"year":200,"decade":180,"title":201,"description":202,"lang":9},"2006","2006年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东: 伯克希尔集团在2006年的净值，增加了169亿美元。因此，A股与B股的每股净值，都较去年成长了18.4%。过去42年（亦即现任管理阶层接手以来)，每股净值由$19成长至$70,281，平均年复合成长率为21.4%。",{"slug":204,"year":204,"decade":180,"title":205,"description":206,"lang":9},"2007","2007年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦全体股东: 伯克希尔在2007年的净值收益为123亿美元。A股与B股的每股净值，都较去年成长11%。过去43年（即现任管理阶层接手以来)，每股账面价值由19美元增长为78,008美元，平均年复合成长率为21.1%。",{"slug":208,"year":208,"decade":180,"title":209,"description":210,"lang":9},"2008","2008年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东： 2008 年我们的市值缩水了 115 亿美元。这让我们两种股票的每股账面价值下滑了 9.6％。在过去的 44 年中（也就是说，现任管理层继任以来），我们的股票每股账面价值从 19美元上升到了 70530 美元，每年增长率为 20.3%。（本报告中所有每股数据是指伯克",{"slug":212,"year":212,"decade":180,"title":213,"description":214,"lang":9},"2009","2009年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东： 2009 年，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的净值增长了 218 亿美元，从而使我们 A 股和 B 股的账面价值每股均上涨 19.8%。在过去 45 年间，即现任管理层接管公司以来，账面价值从 19 美元升至 84,487 美元，每年的复合增长率达 20.3%。(本报告中所有每股数据",{"slug":216,"year":216,"decade":217,"title":218,"description":219,"lang":9},"2010","2010s","2010年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的全体股东： 2010 年，我们 A 股和 B 股的每股账面价值都增长了 13%。也就是说，自从现任管理层接手公司之后，在过去 46 年中，每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到 95，453 美元，年复合增长率为 20.2%。",{"slug":221,"year":221,"decade":217,"title":222,"description":223,"lang":9},"2011","2011年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们： 2011 年，我们公司的 A 股和 B 股（相当于 A 股的 1500 分之 1）的每股账面净值都增长了 4.6%。过去 47 年期间（也就是说从现在的管理层接管公司开始至今），每股账面净值从19 美元增长到了 99,860 美元，每年复合增长率为 19.8%。",{"slug":225,"year":225,"decade":217,"title":226,"description":227,"lang":9},"2012","2012年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦有限公司的股东： 2012 年，伯克希尔为股东实现了 241 亿美元的回报。我们花了 13 亿美元回购股票，因此公司净值今年增长了 228 亿。A 级和 B 级股票的每股账面价值增长了 14.4%。过去的 48年（即从现任的管理层接受以来），每股账面价值从 19 美元增长到了 11",{"slug":229,"year":229,"decade":217,"title":230,"description":231,"lang":9},"2013","2013年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦有限公司的股东： 2013 年，伯克希尔的净值增长了 342 亿美元。这是抵消了 18 亿美元的账面冲销后的数据，账面冲销源于我们购买 Marmon 和 Iscar 的少数股权——这些冲销没有实质上的经济意义，我后面会解释。扣除上述摊销费用后，伯克希尔的 A 级和 B 级股票每股账",{"slug":233,"year":233,"decade":217,"title":234,"description":235,"lang":9},"2014","2014年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔.哈撒韦公司的股东： 2014年伯克希尔的净值增长了183亿美元，公司A类和B类股的每股账面价值增长8.3%。在过去的50年中(即现任管理层上任以来)，公司每股账面价值已从19美元增至146,186美元，年均复合增长率折合为19.4%。①",{"slug":237,"year":237,"decade":217,"title":238,"description":239,"lang":9},"2015","2015年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东们： 伯尔希克·哈撒韦公司2015年的净资产为154亿美元，公司A类和B类股票的每股账面价值增长6.4%。在过去的51年时间里（即现有管理层接手公司开始），公司股票的每股账面价值从19美元增加至155501美元，年复合增长率为19.2%。",{"slug":241,"year":241,"decade":217,"title":242,"description":243,"lang":9},"2016","2016年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东： 2016年伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司净值大增275亿美元，公司A级和B级股票每股账面价值的涨幅都达到了10.7%。在过去的52年时间里(自现有管理层接管公司之后)，公司每股账面价值已经从19美元涨至172108美元，综合年增幅达到19%。",{"slug":245,"year":245,"decade":217,"title":246,"description":247,"lang":9},"2017","2017年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司的股东： 伯克希尔在2017年净资产增值653亿美元，A类和B类股票的每股账面价值均增长23%。在过去的53年里（也就是从现在管理层接手以来），每股账面价值从19美元增长到211750美元，年复合增长率为19.1%。*",{"slug":249,"year":249,"decade":217,"title":250,"description":251,"lang":9},"2018","2018年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔.哈撒韦公司的股东： 2018年当中，伯克希尔的通用会计准则（GAAP）盈利总计为40亿美元。具体而言，这当中包括248亿美元运营盈利，30亿美元源于无形资产受损的非现金亏损（几乎全部来自卡夫亨氏的持股），28亿美元的来自已售出投资证券的兑现资本利得，以及206亿美元的“亏损”，后者是来自",{"slug":253,"year":253,"decade":217,"title":254,"description":255,"lang":9},"2019","2019年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔哈撒伟股东： 根据美国通用会计准则（GAAP），伯克希尔2019年盈利814亿美元，其中包括：运营利润为240亿美元，37亿美元的已实现资本收益，537亿美元是从我们持有股票的未实现资本收益净额的增加中获得的收益。上述收益的每一部分都是在税后基础上列出的。",{"slug":257,"year":257,"decade":258,"title":259,"description":260,"lang":9},"2020","2020s","2020年巴菲特致股东的信","伯克希尔哈撒韦公司致股东： 根据美国公认会计准则（GAAP），伯克希尔2020年的盈利为425亿美元。这一数字的四个组成部分是219亿美元的营业利润，49亿美元的实现资本利得，我们持有的股票中存在的净未实现资本利得增加所带来的267亿美元收益，最后，我们拥有的一些子公司和附属公司的价值减记导致的11",{"slug":262,"year":262,"decade":258,"title":263,"description":264,"lang":9},"2021","2021年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东：  查理·芒格，我的长期合伙人，我的工作是管理你的一部分储蓄。我们非常感谢您的信任。 我们的职位也有责任向你报告我们想知道的事情，如果我们是缺席的老板，而你是经理。我们很高 兴通过这封年信和年会直接与您进行交流。 我们的政策是平等地对待所有的股东。因此，我们不与",{"slug":266,"year":266,"decade":258,"title":267,"description":268,"lang":9},"2022","2022年巴菲特致股东的信","致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东： 　　查理·芒格，我的长期合作伙伴，我们的工作是管理很多人的储蓄。我们感谢他们持久的信任，这种关系往往贯穿他们成年后的大部分时间。在我写这封信的时候，我首先想到的就是那些热心的储蓄者。",{"slug":270,"year":270,"decade":258,"title":271,"description":272,"lang":9},"2023","2023年巴菲特致股东的信","2月24日晚间，“股神”沃伦·巴菲特旗下公司伯克希尔·哈撒韦公布了2023年四季度、全年财报，以及最新的巴菲特第47封年度致股东信（附历年股东信合辑）。 同时，在2023年财报中，巴菲特特别发布了一篇纪念老搭档查理·芒格的文章，题为《查理·芒格——伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的缔造者 》（《Charlie",{"slug":274,"year":274,"decade":258,"title":275,"description":276,"lang":277},"2024","2024年度信（官方英文原文）","BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.  To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:","en",{"slug":279,"year":279,"decade":280,"title":281,"description":282,"lang":9},"2025-meeting","附录","2025巴菲特股东大会全程实录（非年度信，附于文末）","十大讲话要点： 1、谈接班人：计划在年底退休，阿贝尔在各方面都做好了担任伯克希尔哈CEO的准备，将建议董事会在年底前任命阿贝尔为公司CEO。",{"slug":284,"year":284,"decade":258,"title":285,"description":286,"lang":277},"2025","2025年度信（官方英文原文）","Berkshire Hathaway Inc.  To My Fellow Berkshire Shareholders,",{"slug":274,"year":274,"decade":258,"title":275,"description":276,"lang":277,"html":288,"toc":289,"prev":290,"next":291},"\u003Cp>BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.\nTo the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:\nThis letter comes to you as part of Berkshire’s annual report. As a public company, we\nare required to periodically tell you many specific facts and figures.\n“Report,” however, implies a greater responsibility. In addition to the mandated data, we\nbelieve we owe you additional commentary about what you own and how we think. Our goal is\nto communicate with you in a manner that we would wish you to use if our positions were\nreversed – that is, if you were Berkshire’s CEO while I and my family were passive investors,\ntrusting you with our savings.\nThis approach leads us to an annual recitation of both good and bad developments at the\nmany businesses you indirectly own through your Berkshire shares. When discussing problems\nat specific subsidiaries, we do, however, try to follow the advice Tom Murphy gave to me 60\nyears ago: “praise by name, criticize by category.”\nMistakes – Yes, We Make Them at Berkshire\nSometimes I’ve made mistakes in assessing the future economics of a business I’ve\npurchased for Berkshire – each a case of capital allocation gone wrong. That happens with both\njudgments about marketable equities – we view these as partial ownership of businesses – and\nthe 100% acquisitions of companies.\nAt other times, I’ve made mistakes when assessing the abilities or fidelity of the\nmanagers Berkshire is hiring. The fidelity disappointments can hurt beyond their financial\nimpact, a pain that can approach that of a failed marriage.\nA decent batting average in personnel decisions is all that can be hoped for. The cardinal\nsin is delaying the correction of mistakes or what Charlie Munger called “thumb-sucking.”\nProblems, he would tell me, cannot be wished away. They require action, however\nuncomfortable that may be.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>During the 2019-23 period, I have used the words “mistake” or “error” 16 times in my\nletters to you. Many other huge companies have never used either word over that span. Amazon,\nI should acknowledge, made some brutally candid observations in its 2021 letter. Elsewhere, it\nhas generally been happy talk and pictures.\n1\nI have also been a director of large public companies at which “mistake” or “wrong” were\nforbidden words at board meetings or analyst calls. That taboo, implying managerial perfection,\nalways made me nervous (though, at times, there could be legal issues that make limited\ndiscussion advisable. We live in a very litigious society.)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>At 94, it won’t be long before Greg Abel replaces me as CEO and will be writing the\nannual letters. Greg shares the Berkshire creed that a “report” is what a Berkshire CEO annually\nowes to owners. And he also understands that if you start fooling your shareholders, you will\nsoon believe your own baloney and be fooling yourself as well.\nPete Liegl – One of a Kind\nLet me pause to tell you the remarkable story of Pete Liegl, a man unknown to most\nBerkshire shareholders but one who contributed many billions to their aggregate wealth. Pete\ndied in November, still working at 80.\nI first heard of Forest River – the Indiana company Pete founded and managed – on\nJune 21, 2005. On that day I received a letter from an intermediary detailing relevant data about\nthe company, a recreational vehicle (“RV”) manufacturer. The writer said that Pete, the 100%\nowner of Forest River, specifically wanted to sell to Berkshire. He also told me the price that Pete\nexpected to receive. I liked this no-nonsense approach.\nI did some checking with RV dealers, liked what I learned and arranged a June 28th\nmeeting in Omaha. Pete brought along his wife, Sharon, and daughter, Lisa. When we met, Pete\nassured me that he wanted to keep running the business but would feel more comfortable if he\ncould assure financial security for his family.\nPete next mentioned that he owned some real estate that was leased to Forest River and\nhad not been covered in the June 21 letter. Within a few minutes, we arrived at a price for those\nassets as I expressed no need for appraisal by Berkshire but would simply accept his valuation.\nThen we arrived at the other point that needed clarity. I asked Pete what his compensation\nshould be, adding that whatever he said, I would accept. (This, I should add, is not an approach I\nrecommend for general use.)\nPete paused as his wife, daughter and I leaned forward. Then he surprised us: “Well, I\nlooked at Berkshire’s proxy statement and I wouldn’t want to make more than my boss, so pay\nme $100,000 per year.” After I picked myself off the floor, Pete added: “But we will earn X (he\nnamed a number) this year, and I would like an annual bonus of 10% of any earnings above what\nthe company is now delivering.” I replied: “OK Pete, but if Forest River makes any significant\nacquisitions we will make an appropriate adjustment for the additional capital thus employed.” I\ndidn’t define “appropriate” or “significant,” but those vague terms never caused a problem.\n2\nThe four of us then went to dinner at Omaha’s Happy Hollow Club and lived happily\never after. During the next 19 years, Pete shot the lights out. No competitor came close to his\nperformance.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>Every company doesn’t have an easy-to-understand business and there are very few\nowners or managers like Pete. And, of course, I expect to make my share of mistakes about the\nbusinesses Berkshire buys and sometimes err in evaluating the sort of person with whom I’m\ndealing.\nBut I’ve also had many pleasant surprises in both the potential of the business as well as\nthe ability and fidelity of the manager. And our experience is that a single winning decision can\nmake a breathtaking difference over time. (Think GEICO as a business decision, Ajit Jain as a\nmanagerial decision and my luck in finding Charlie Munger as a one-of-a-kind partner, personal\nadvisor and steadfast friend.) Mistakes fade away; winners can forever blossom.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>One further point in our CEO selections: I never look at where a candidate has gone to\nschool. Never!\nOf course, there are great managers who attended the most famous schools. But there are\nplenty such as Pete who may have benefitted by attending a less prestigious institution or even\nby not bothering to finish school. Look at my friend, Bill Gates, who decided that it was far more\nimportant to get underway in an exploding industry that would change the world than it was to\nstick around for a parchment that he could hang on the wall. (Read his new book, Source Code.)\nNot long ago, I met – by phone – Jessica Toonkel, whose step-grandfather, Ben Rosner,\nlong ago ran a business for Charlie and me. Ben was a retailing genius and, in preparing for this\nreport, I checked with Jessica to confirm Ben’s schooling, which I remembered as limited.\nJessica’s reply: “Ben never went past 6th grade.”\nI was lucky enough to get an education at three fine universities. And I avidly believe in\nlifelong learning. I’ve observed, however, that a very large portion of business talent is innate\nwith nature swamping nurture.\nPete Liegl was a natural.\n3\nLast Year’s Performance\nIn 2024, Berkshire did better than I expected though 53% of our 189 operating\nbusinesses reported a decline in earnings. We were aided by a predictable large gain in\ninvestment income as Treasury Bill yields improved and we substantially increased our holdings\nof these highly-liquid short-term securities.\nOur insurance business also delivered a major increase in earnings, led by the\nperformance of GEICO. In five years, Todd Combs has reshaped GEICO in a major way,\nincreasing efficiency and bringing underwriting practices up to date. GEICO was a long-held\ngem that needed major repolishing, and Todd has worked tirelessly in getting the job done.\nThough not yet complete, the 2024 improvement was spectacular.\nIn general, property-casualty (“P\u002FC”) insurance pricing strengthened during 2024,\nreflecting a major increase in damage from convective storms. Climate change may have been\nannouncing its arrival. However, no “monster” event occurred during 2024. Someday, any day, a\ntruly staggering insurance loss will occur – and there is no guarantee that there will be only one\nper annum.\nThe P\u002FC business is so central to Berkshire that it warrants a further discussion that\nappears later in this letter.\nBerkshire’s railroad and utility operations, our two largest businesses outside of\ninsurance, improved their aggregate earnings. Both, however, have much left to accomplish.\nLate in the year we increased our ownership of the utility operation from about 92% to\n100% at a cost of roughly $3.9 billion, of which $2.9 billion was paid in cash with a balance in\nBerkshire “B” shares.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>All told, we recorded operating earnings of $47.4 billion in 2024. We regularly – endlessly,\nsome readers may groan – emphasize this measure rather than the GAAP-mandated earnings that\nare reported on page K-68.\nOur measure excludes capital gains or losses on the stocks and bonds we own, whether\nrealized or unrealized. Over time, we think it highly likely that gains will prevail – why else\nwould we buy these securities? – though the year-by-year numbers will swing wildly and\nunpredictably. Our horizon for such commitments is almost always far longer than a single year.\nIn many, our thinking involves decades. These long-termers are the purchases that sometimes\nmake the cash register ring like church bells.\n4\nHere’s a breakdown of the 2023-24 earnings as we see them. All calculations are after\ndepreciation, amortization and income tax. EBITDA, a flawed favorite of Wall Street, is not for\nus.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>(in $ millions)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>2024\n2023\nInsurance-underwriting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n$ 9,020 $ 5,428\nInsurance-investment income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n13,670\n9,567\nBNSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n5,031\n5,087\nBerkshire Hathaway Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n3,730\n2,331\nOther controlled businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n13,072\n13,362\nNon-controlled businesses* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n1,519\n1,750\nOther** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n1,395\n(175)\nOperating earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n$47,437 $37,350\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cul>\n\u003Cli>Includes certain businesses in which Berkshire had between a 20% and 50% ownership\nsuch as Kraft Heinz, Occidental Petroleum and Berkadia.\n** Includes foreign currency exchange gains of approximately $1.1 billion in 2024 and\napproximately $211 million in 2023 produced by our usage of non-U.S. dollar-denominated\ndebt.\nSurprise, Surprise! An Important American Record is Smashed\nSixty years ago, present management took control of Berkshire. That move was a\nmistake – my mistake – and one that plagued us for two decades. Charlie, I should emphasize,\nspotted my obvious error immediately: Though the price I paid for Berkshire looked cheap, its\nbusiness – a large northern textile operation – was headed for extinction.\nThe U.S. Treasury, of all places, had already received silent warnings of Berkshire’s\ndestiny. In 1965, the company did not pay a dime of income tax, an embarrassment that had\ngenerally prevailed at the company for a decade. That sort of economic behavior may be\nunderstandable for glamorous startups, but it’s a blinking yellow light when it happens at a\nvenerable pillar of American industry. Berkshire was headed for the ash can.\nFast forward 60 years and imagine the surprise at the Treasury when that same\ncompany – still operating under the name of Berkshire Hathaway – paid far more in corporate\nincome tax than the U.S. government had ever received from any company – even the American\ntech titans that commanded market values in the trillions.\nTo be precise, Berkshire last year made four payments to the IRS that totaled $26.8\nbillion. That’s about 5% of what all of corporate America paid. (In addition, we paid sizable\namounts for income taxes to foreign governments and to 44 states.)\n5\nNote one crucial factor allowing this record-shattering payment: Berkshire shareholders\nduring the same 1965-2024 period received only one cash dividend. On January 3, 1967, we\ndisbursed our sole payment – $101,755 or 10¢ per A share. (I can’t remember why I suggested\nthis action to Berkshire’s board of directors. Now it seems like a bad dream.)\nFor sixty years, Berkshire shareholders endorsed continuous reinvestment and that\nenabled the company to build its taxable income. Cash income-tax payments to the U.S.\nTreasury, miniscule in the first decade, now aggregate more than $101 billion . . . and counting.\u003C\u002Fli>\n\u003C\u002Ful>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>Huge numbers can be hard to visualize. Let me recast the $26.8 billion that we paid last\nyear.\nIf Berkshire had sent the Treasury a $1 million check every 20 minutes throughout all of\n2024 – visualize 366 days and nights because 2024 was a leap year – we still would have owed\nthe federal government a significant sum at yearend. Indeed, it would be well into January before\nthe Treasury would tell us that we could take a short breather, get some sleep, and prepare for our\n2025 tax payments.\nWhere Your Money Is\nBerkshire’s equity activity is ambidextrous. In one hand we own control of many\nbusinesses, holding at least 80% of the investee’s shares. Generally, we own 100%.\nThese 189 subsidiaries have similarities to marketable common stocks but are far from\nidentical. The collection is worth many hundreds of billions and includes a few rare gems,\nmany good-but-far-from-fabulous businesses and some laggards that have been disappointments.\nWe own nothing that is a major drag, but we have a number that I should not have purchased.\nIn the other hand, we own a small percentage of a dozen or so very large and highly\nprofitable businesses with household names such as Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola and\nMoody’s. Many of these companies earn very high returns on the net tangible equity required for\ntheir operations. At yearend, our partial-ownership holdings were valued at $272 billion.\nUnderstandably, really outstanding businesses are very seldom offered in their entirety, but small\nfractions of these gems can be purchased Monday through Friday on Wall Street and, very\noccasionally, they sell at bargain prices.\nWe are impartial in our choice of equity vehicles, investing in either variety based upon\nwhere we can best deploy your (and my family’s) savings. Often, nothing looks compelling; very\ninfrequently we find ourselves knee-deep in opportunities. Greg has vividly shown his ability to\nact at such times as did Charlie.\n6\nWith marketable equities, it is easier to change course when I make a mistake.\nBerkshire’s present size, it should be underscored, diminishes this valuable option. We can’t\ncome and go on a dime. Sometimes a year or more is required to establish or divest an\ninvestment. Additionally, with ownership of minority positions we can’t change management if\nthat action is needed or control what is done with capital flows if we are unhappy with the\ndecisions being made.\nWith controlled companies, we can dictate these decisions, but we have far less flexibility\nin the disposition of mistakes. In reality, Berkshire almost never sells controlled businesses\nunless we face what we believe to be unending problems. An offset is that some business owners\nseek out Berkshire because of our steadfast behavior. Occasionally, that can be a decided plus for\nus.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>Despite what some commentators currently view as an extraordinary cash position at\nBerkshire, the great majority of your money remains in equities. That preference won’t change.\nWhile our ownership in marketable equities moved downward last year from $354 billion to\n$272 billion, the value of our non-quoted controlled equities increased somewhat and remains far\ngreater than the value of the marketable portfolio.\nBerkshire shareholders can rest assured that we will forever deploy a substantial majority\nof their money in equities – mostly American equities although many of these will have\ninternational operations of significance. Berkshire will never prefer ownership of cash-equivalent\nassets over the ownership of good businesses, whether controlled or only partially owned.\nPaper money can see its value evaporate if fiscal folly prevails. In some countries, this\nreckless practice has become habitual, and, in our country’s short history, the U.S. has come\nclose to the edge. Fixed-coupon bonds provide no protection against runaway currency.\nBusinesses, as well as individuals with desired talents, however, will usually find a way\nto cope with monetary instability as long as their goods or services are desired by the country’s\ncitizenry. So, too, with personal skills. Lacking such assets as athletic excellence, a wonderful\nvoice, medical or legal skills or, for that matter, any special talents, I have had to rely on equities\nthroughout my life. In effect, I have depended on the success of American businesses and I will\ncontinue to do so.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>One way or another, the sensible – better yet imaginative – deployment of savings by\ncitizens is required to propel an ever-growing societal output of desired goods and services. This\nsystem is called capitalism. It has its faults and abuses – in certain respects more egregious now\nthan ever – but it also can work wonders unmatched by other economic systems.\nAmerica is Exhibit A. Our country’s progress over its mere 235 years of existence could\nnot have been imagined by even the most optimistic colonists in 1789, when the Constitution\nwas adopted and the country’s energies were unleashed.\n7\nTrue, our country in its infancy sometimes borrowed abroad to supplement our own\nsavings. But, concurrently, we needed many Americans to consistently save and then needed\nthose savers or other Americans to wisely deploy the capital thus made available. If America had\nconsumed all that it produced, the country would have been spinning its wheels.\nThe American process has not always been pretty – our country has forever had many\nscoundrels and promoters who seek to take advantage of those who mistakenly trust them with\ntheir savings. But even with such malfeasance – which remains in full force today – and also\nmuch deployment of capital that eventually floundered because of brutal competition or\ndisruptive innovation, the savings of Americans has delivered a quantity and quality of output\nbeyond the dreams of any colonist.\nFrom a base of only four million people – and despite a brutal internal war early on,\npitting one American against another – America changed the world in the blink of a celestial eye.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>In a very minor way, Berkshire shareholders have participated in the American miracle by\nforegoing dividends, thereby electing to reinvest rather than consume. Originally, this\nreinvestment was tiny, almost meaningless, but over time, it mushroomed, reflecting the mixture\nof a sustained culture of savings, combined with the magic of long-term compounding.\nBerkshire’s activities now impact all corners of our country. And we are not finished.\nCompanies die for many reasons but, unlike the fate of humans, old age itself is not lethal.\nBerkshire today is far more youthful than it was in 1965.\nHowever, as Charlie and I have always acknowledged, Berkshire would not have\nachieved its results in any locale except America whereas America would have been every bit the\nsuccess it has been if Berkshire had never existed.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>So thank you, Uncle Sam. Someday your nieces and nephews at Berkshire hope to send\nyou even larger payments than we did in 2024. Spend it wisely. Take care of the many who, for\nno fault of their own, get the short straws in life. They deserve better. And never forget that we\nneed you to maintain a stable currency and that result requires both wisdom and vigilance on\nyour part.\nProperty-Casualty Insurance\nP\u002FC insurance continues to be Berkshire’s core business. The industry follows a financial\nmodel that is rare – very rare – among giant businesses.\nCustomarily, companies incur costs for labor, materials, inventories, plant and equipment,\netc. before – or concurrently with – the sale of their products or services. Consequently, their\nCEOs have a good fix on knowing the cost of their product before they sell it. If the selling price\nis less than its cost, managers soon learn they have a problem. Hemorrhaging cash is hard to\nignore.\n8\nWhen writing P\u002FC insurance, we receive payment upfront and much later learn what our\nproduct has cost us – sometimes a moment of truth that is delayed as much as 30 or more years.\n(We are still making substantial payments on asbestos exposures that occurred 50 or more years\nago.)\nThis mode of operations has the desirable effect of giving P\u002FC insurers cash before\nthey incur most expenses but carries with it the risk that the company can be losing\nmoney – sometimes mountains of money – before the CEO and directors realize what is\nhappening.\nCertain lines of insurance minimize this mismatch, such as crop insurance or hail damage\nin which losses are quickly reported, evaluated and paid. Other lines, however, can lead to\nexecutive and shareholder bliss as the company is going broke. Think coverages such as medical\nmalpractice or product liability. In “long-tail” lines, a P\u002FC insurer may report large but fictitious\nprofits to its owners and regulators for many years – even decades. The accounting can be\nparticularly dangerous if the CEO is an optimist or a crook. These possibilities are not fanciful:\nHistory reveals a large number of each species.\nIn recent decades, this “money-up-front, loss-payments-later” model has allowed\nBerkshire to invest large sums (“float”) while generally delivering what we believe to be a small\nunderwriting profit. We make estimates for “surprises” and, so far, these estimates have been\nsufficient.\nWe are not deterred by the dramatic and growing loss payments sustained by our\nactivities. (As I write this, think wildfires.) It’s our job to price to absorb these and unemotionally\ntake our lumps when surprises develop. It’s also our job to contest “runaway” verdicts, spurious\nlitigation and outright fraudulent behavior.\nUnder Ajit, our insurance operation has blossomed from an obscure Omaha-based\ncompany into a world leader, renowned for both its taste for risk and its Gibraltar-like financial\nstrength. Moreover, Greg, our directors and I all have a very large investment in Berkshire in\nrelation to any compensation we receive. We do not use options or other one-sided forms of\ncompensation; if you lose money, so do we. This approach encourages caution but does not\nensure foresight.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>P\u002FC insurance growth is dependent on increased economic risk. No risk – no need for\ninsurance.\nThink back only 135 years when the world had no autos, trucks or airplanes. Now there\nare 300 million vehicles in the U.S. alone, a massive fleet causing huge damage daily. Property\ndamage arising from hurricanes, tornadoes and wildfires is massive, growing and increasingly\nunpredictable in their patterns and eventual costs.\n9\nIt would be foolish – make that madness – to write ten-year policies for these coverages,\nbut we believe one-year assumption of such risks is generally manageable. If we change our\nminds, we will change the contracts we offer. During my lifetime, auto insurers have generally\nabandoned one-year policies and switched to the six-month variety. This change reduced float\nbut allowed more intelligent underwriting.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>No private insurer has the willingness to take on the amount of risk that Berkshire can\nprovide. At times, this advantage can be important. But we also need to shrink when prices are\ninadequate. We must never write inadequately-priced policies in order to stay in the game. That\npolicy is corporate suicide.\nProperly pricing P\u002FC insurance is part art, part science and is definitely not a business for\noptimists. Mike Goldberg, the Berkshire executive who recruited Ajit, said it best: “We want our\nunderwriters to daily come to work nervous, but not paralyzed.”\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>All things considered, we like the P\u002FC insurance business. Berkshire can financially and\npsychologically handle extreme losses without blinking. We are also not dependent on reinsurers\nand that gives us a material and enduring cost advantage. Finally, we have outstanding managers\n(no optimists) and are particularly well-situated to utilize the substantial sums P\u002FC insurance\ndelivers for investment.\nOver the past two decades, our insurance business has generated $32 billion of after-tax\nprofits from underwriting, about 3.3 cents per dollar of sales after income tax. Meanwhile, our\nfloat has grown from $46 billion to $171 billion. The float is likely to grow a bit over time and,\nwith intelligent underwriting (and some luck), has a reasonable prospect of being costless.\nBerkshire Increases its Japanese Investments\nA small but important exception to our U.S.-based focus is our growing investment in\nJapan.\nIt’s been almost six years since Berkshire began purchasing shares in five Japanese\ncompanies that very successfully operate in a manner somewhat similar to Berkshire itself. The\nfive are (alphabetically) ITOCHU, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo. Each of these\nlarge enterprises, in turn, owns interests in a vast array of businesses, many based in Japan but\nothers that operate throughout the world.\n10\nBerkshire made its first purchases involving the five in July 2019. We simply looked at\ntheir financial records and were amazed at the low prices of their stocks. As the years have\npassed, our admiration for these companies has consistently grown. Greg has met many times\nwith them, and I regularly follow their progress. Both of us like their capital deployment, their\nmanagements and their attitude in respect to their investors.\nEach of the five companies increase dividends when appropriate, they repurchase their\nshares when it is sensible to do so, and their top managers are far less aggressive in their\ncompensation programs than their U.S. counterparts.\nOur holdings of the five are for the very long term, and we are committed to supporting\ntheir boards of directors. From the start, we also agreed to keep Berkshire’s holdings below 10%\nof each company’s shares. But, as we approached this limit, the five companies agreed to\nmoderately relax the ceiling. Over time, you will likely see Berkshire’s ownership of all five\nincrease somewhat.\nAt yearend, Berkshire’s aggregate cost (in dollars) was $13.8 billion and the market value\nof our holdings totaled $23.5 billion.\nMeanwhile, Berkshire has consistently – but not pursuant to any formula – increased its\nyen-denominated borrowings. All are at fixed rates, no “floaters.” Greg and I have no view on\nfuture foreign exchange rates and therefore seek a position approximating currency-neutrality.\nWe are required, however, under GAAP rules to regularly recognize in our earnings a calculation\nof any gains or losses in the yen we have borrowed and, at yearend, had included $2.3 billion of\nafter-tax gains due to dollar strength of which $850 million occurred in 2024.\nI expect that Greg and his eventual successors will be holding this Japanese position for\nmany decades and that Berkshire will find other ways to work productively with the five\ncompanies in the future.\nWe like the current math of our yen-balanced strategy as well. As I write this, the annual\ndividend income expected from the Japanese investments in 2025 will total about $812 million\nand the interest cost of our yen-denominated debt will be about $135 million.\nThe Annual Gathering in Omaha\nI hope you will join us in Omaha on May 3rd. We are following a somewhat changed\nschedule this year, but the basics remain the same. Our goal is that you get many of your\nquestions answered, that you connect with friends, and that you leave with a good impression of\nOmaha. The city looks forward to your visits.\n11\nWe will have much the same group of volunteers to offer you a wide variety of Berkshire\nproducts that will lighten your wallet and brighten your day. As usual, we will be open on Friday\nfrom noon until 5 p.m. with lovable Squishmallows, underwear from Fruit of the Loom, Brooks\nrunning shoes and a host of other items to tempt you.\nAgain, we will have only one book for sale. Last year we featured Poor Charlie’s\nAlmanack and sold out – 5,000 copies disappeared before the close of business on Saturday.\nThis year we will offer 60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway. In 2015, I asked Carrie Sova,\nwho among her many duties managed much of the activity at the annual meeting, to try her hand\nat putting together a light-hearted history of Berkshire. I gave her full reign to use her\nimagination, and she quickly produced a book that blew me away with its ingenuity, contents and\ndesign.\nSubsequently, Carrie left Berkshire to raise a family and now has three children. But each\nsummer, the Berkshire office force gets together to watch the Omaha Storm Chasers play\nbaseball against a Triple A opponent. I ask a few alums to join us, and Carrie usually comes with\nher family. At this year’s event, I brazenly asked her if she would do a 60th Anniversary issue,\nfeaturing Charlie’s photos, quotes and stories that have seldom been made public.\nEven with three young children to manage, Carrie immediately said “yes.” Consequently,\nwe will have 5,000 copies of the new book available for sale on Friday afternoon and from\n7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturday.\nCarrie refused any payment for her extensive work on the new “Charlie” edition. I\nsuggested she and I co-sign 20 copies to be given to any shareholder contributing $5,000 to the\nStephen Center that serves homeless adults and children in South Omaha. The Kizer family,\nbeginning with Bill Kizer, Sr., my long-time friend and Carrie’s grandfather, have for decades\nbeen assisting this worthy institution. Whatever is raised through the sale of the 20 autographed\nbooks, I will match.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>Becky Quick will cover our somewhat re-engineered gathering on Saturday. Becky\nknows Berkshire like a book and always arranges interesting interviews with managers,\ninvestors, shareholders and an occasional celebrity. She and her CNBC crew do a great job of\nboth transmitting our meetings worldwide and archiving much Berkshire-related material. Give\nour director, Steve Burke, credit for the archive idea.\nWe will not have a movie this year but rather will convene a bit earlier at 8 a.m. I will\nmake a few introductory remarks, and we will promptly get to the Q&A, alternating questions\nbetween Becky and the audience.\n12\nGreg and Ajit will join me in answering questions and we will take a half-hour break at\n10:30 a.m. When we reconvene at 11:00 a.m., only Greg will join me on stage. This year we will\ndisband at 1:00 p.m. but stay open for shopping in the exhibit area until 4:00 p.m.\nYou can find the full details regarding weekend activities on page 16. Note particularly\nthe always-popular Brooks run on Sunday morning. (I will be sleeping.)\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>My wise and good-looking sister, Bertie, of whom I wrote last year, will be attending the\nmeeting along with two of her daughters, both good-looking as well. Observers all agree that the\ngenes producing this dazzling result flow down only the female side of the family. (Sob.)\nBertie is now 91 and we talk regularly on Sundays using old-fashion telephones for\ncommunications. We cover the joys of old age and discuss such exciting topics as the relative\nmerits of our canes. In my case, the utility is limited to the avoidance of falling flat on my face.\nBut Bertie regularly one-ups me by asserting that she enjoys an additional benefit: When\na woman uses a cane, she tells me, men quit “hitting” on her. Bertie’s explanation is that the male\nego is such that little old ladies with canes simply aren’t an appropriate target. Presently, I have\nno data to counter her assertion.\nBut I have suspicions. At the meeting I can’t see much from the stage, and I would\nappreciate it if attendees would keep an eye on Bertie. Let me know if the cane is really doing its\njob. My bet is that she will be surrounded by males. For those of a certain age, the scene will\nbring back memories of Scarlett O’Hara and her horde of male admirers in Gone with the Wind.\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n\u003Cp>The Berkshire directors and I immensely enjoy having you come to Omaha, and I predict\nthat you will have a good time and likely make some new friends.\nFebruary 22, 2025\nWarren E. Buffett\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Chairman of the Board\n13\nBerkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Annual Percentage Change\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Year\nin Per-Share\nMarket Value of\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Berkshire\nin S&P 500\nwith Dividends\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Included\n1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n49.5%\n10.0%\n1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(3.4)\n(11.7)\n1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n13.3\n30.9\n1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n77.8\n11.0\n1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n19.4\n(8.4)\n1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(4.6)\n3.9\n1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n80.5\n14.6\n1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n8.1\n18.9\n1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(2.5)\n(14.8)\n1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(48.7)\n(26.4)\n1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n2.5\n37.2\n1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n129.3\n23.6\n1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n46.8\n(7.4)\n1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n14.5\n6.4\n1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n102.5\n18.2\n1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n32.8\n32.3\n1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n31.8\n(5.0)\n1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n38.4\n21.4\n1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n69.0\n22.4\n1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(2.7)\n6.1\n1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n93.7\n31.6\n1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n14.2\n18.6\n1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n4.6\n5.1\n1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n59.3\n16.6\n1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n84.6\n31.7\n1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(23.1)\n(3.1)\n1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n35.6\n30.5\n1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n29.8\n7.6\n1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n38.9\n10.1\n1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n25.0\n1.3\nNote: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9\u002F30; 1967, 15 months ended 12\u002F31.\n14\nBerkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Annual Percentage Change\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Year\nin Per-Share\nMarket Value of\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Berkshire\nin S&P 500\nwith Dividends\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Cp>Included\n1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n57.4%\n37.6%\n1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n6.2\n23.0\n1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n34.9\n33.4\n1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n52.2\n28.6\n1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(19.9)\n21.0\n2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n26.6\n(9.1)\n2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n6.5\n(11.9)\n2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(3.8)\n(22.1)\n2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n15.8\n28.7\n2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n4.3\n10.9\n2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n0.8\n4.9\n2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n24.1\n15.8\n2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n28.7\n5.5\n2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(31.8)\n(37.0)\n2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n2.7\n26.5\n2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n21.4\n15.1\n2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(4.7)\n2.1\n2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n16.8\n16.0\n2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n32.7\n32.4\n2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n27.0\n13.7\n2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n(12.5)\n1.4\n2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n23.4\n12.0\n2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n21.9\n21.8\n2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n2.8\n(4.4)\n2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n11.0\n31.5\n2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n2.4\n18.4\n2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n29.6\n28.7\n2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n4.0\n(18.1)\n2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n15.8\n26.3\n2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n25.5\n25.0\nCompounded Annual Gain – 1965-2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n19.9%\n10.4%\nOverall Gain – 1964-2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n5,502,284%\n39,054%\n15\u003C\u002Fp>\n\u003Chr>\n",[],{"slug":270,"title":271,"year":270},{"slug":279,"title":281,"year":279},1789889214131]